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Abstract 
This thesis examines the share price reaction to private placements with cash settlements on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange in the time period from January 1st 2004 to December 31st 2010. 
A significant negative average abnormal return is observed on the announcement day. This 
market reaction is primarily explained by dilution to current shareholders from private 
placement discounts. The sample shows evidence of a significant run-up in the year before 
the private placement, and a significant negative share price development in the years after 
the private placement. The results contradict both the monitoring hypothesis and the 
certification hypothesis, and offers support to alternative hypotheses, such as managerial 
entrenchment and timing. 
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1. Preface 
1.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the recent use of private placements in the Norwegian 
stock market as requested by the Norwegian Corporate Governance Board (NUES). Each 
year NUES produces and publishes the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate 
Governance with the purpose ”to clarify the respective roles of shareholders, board of 
directors and executive officers beyond the requirements of the legislation.” NUES initiated 
this study for their annual Forum for Corporate Governance after they had observed a recent 
surge in the use of private placements on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE).  
This thesis will focus on how the private placements affect shareholders’ wealth, both new 
and existing. Most international studies indicate that the market reacts positively to the 
announcement of a private placement even though they are often issued at a discount (Eckbo 
et al., 2007). Eckbo and Norli (2005) showed that this also held for the Norwegian market in 
the time period from 1984 to 1996. These results are in contrast to the negative 
announcement returns found for public equity issues (Eckbo et al., 2007).  
Two hypotheses for the observed positive market reaction to private placements are 
prevalent in the literature. Wruck`s monitoring hypothesis (1989) suggests that purchasers of 
private placements of common stock are active investors that increase the monitoring of 
management, particularly in firms with low ownership concentrations. Hertzel and Smith`s 
information hypothesis (1993) claims that a private placement induces value verification by 
informed investors. They argue that private placement discounts are compensation for 
information costs, while the observed positive abnormal announcement day returns reflect 
positive signaling.  
To analyze the recent surge in the use of private placements, as observed by NUES, the 
sample period for this study was set to be from 01.01.2004 to 31.12.2010. After careful 
examination of the raw sample, the final sample consisted of 222 private placements with 
cash settlements. Private placements that coincided with press releases judged to 
significantly impact the company’s share price, particularly announcements of acquisitions, 
contracts and issues of other types of securities were omitted from the sample. It would be 
advantageous to look at private placements over a longer period with a larger sample size, 
but the use of private placements prior to 2004 was very limited.  
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Contrary to previous research on the OSE, a significant negative abnormal share price 
reaction on the announcement date was observed in the sample period. However, when 
adjusting the share price reaction for the private placement discount, the share price reaction 
was only significant at the 10% level. This indicates that the sample private placements did 
not significantly change the market`s perception of the firm. 
The long-run event study analysis showed evidence of both a highly significant positive drift 
the year before the private placement announcement and a highly significant negative drift 
the years after. The effect was most pronounced in the months prior to and after the event 
date. The average firm in the sample had a cumulative abnormal return of +28.6% in the 
year before the private placement, and a cumulative abnormal return of -16.1% in the two 
years after the private placement. These results are similar to those found by Barclay et al. 
(2007), who proposed managerial entrenchment as a possible explanation for this 
phenomenon. They argue that managers can use private placements to further their own 
interests at the expense of the shareholders. Shares are placed in the hands of friendly 
investors, to discourage takeover bids.  
An alternative explanation for the run-up before the private placement, and the subsequent 
drop after the issue, could be timing by managers. The sample results indicate that managers 
conduct private placements when they view the firm as overvalued. If this is the case, the 
firms conducting a private placement is skewed towards firms with a value above their 
intrinsic value – explaining both the observed pre-issue and post-issue share price 
development.  
Molin’s (1996) research on the Swedish stock market showed that “examining private 
placements in a slightly different market environment may provide useful insights into the 
mechanisms at work”. Institutional differences between the various stock markets may help 
explaining why the literature is so divided when it comes to private placements.  
In the sense that they are not targeted towards specific investors, the sample private 
placements resemble public placements. This could explain why the observed share price 
reaction is more similar to the reactions observed for studies of public placements than to 
those of most other private placements studies. The choice to conduct a private placement 
instead of a rights issue seems to be dominated by costs and a perceived need to issue stock 
quickly, more so than the desire to acquire valuable investors.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides an introduction to private placements 
and describes how they are typically carried out on the OSE, while section 1.3 delves into 
the history of the OSE to investigate how the ownership concentration and the mix of firms 
and investors have changed during the sample period. Section 2 overviews the existing 
research and theories on private placements. Section 3 and 4 describes the sample data and 
the event study methodology, respectively. The results from both the short-run and the long-
run event study are reported in section 5, while section 6 contains the analysis of the results. 
Section 7 includes conclusions and a discussion of the limitations of this thesis. 
1.2 Private placements 
The following section describes private placements and how they differ from other types of 
equity issues, before going into detail about the history of equity issues on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange (OSE) and how a typical private placement is carried out. This includes the recent 
development of the use of board authorizations to issue equity.  
Seasoned Equity Offerings 
After the initial public offering (IPO) the company has a variety of options to raise new 
equity capital. An offering subsequent to the IPO is often called a follow-on offering, 
secondary equity offering, or seasoned equity offering (SEO). In these offerings, the 
company issues new shares and offers them to investors. The argument to raise new capital 
could be to do structural changes such as acquisitions or mergers, to be able to fund capital 
expenditures and investments, to provide strategic flexibility, or to improve the financial 
situation. In extreme cases, the SEO is conducted to avoid facing bankruptcy. The three most 
applied issues are direct issues, rights issues and private placements. The difference between 
the various types of equity issues is to whom they are directed.  
 
Seasoned Equity Offering 
Direct Issue Rights Issue Private Placement 
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First, direct issues are directed towards all investors, both existing and potentially new 
investors. It resembles an IPO in the sense that it is accessible to everyone. This is also why 
it is often called a public issue.  
Second, rights issues are directed towards existing shareholders. The existing shareholders 
have the right to buy a specified number of shares at a specified price within a specified 
period of time. The number of shares allocated to each shareholder depends on the number 
of shares owned prior to the rights issue. Outside investors are not invited to participate.  
Third, private placements are directed towards a predefined group of investors. The group of 
investors may consist of a subgroup of existing investors, potentially new investors or both. 
Only some of the existing investors are invited to participate in the private placement. 
Dilution 
New shares in an equity issue are typically issued at a discount to the prevailing market 
price, thus diluting the investment of existing shareholders. In addition, the total number of 
shares increases – resulting in ownership dilution. The existing shareholders will own a 
smaller part of a larger company.  
To make the issue of new capital attractive to investors, the equity issue must be backed by 
earnings growth. More specifically, the reinvested proceeds must offer a return on equity 
equal to or higher than the return on the existing business. If this is not the case, the value of 
existing shareholders’ investment will be diluted.  
However, since the proceeds from the equity issue is usually a part of the firm’s long-term 
strategy, the current earnings per share will be diluted as a result of the increase in shares 
outstanding. To investors with a short investment horizon, this may be viewed as 
unfavorable.  
The various types of equity issues affect existing shareholders differently. In a rights issue 
the allocation of new shares are decided on a pro rata basis. Thus, if all the existing investors 
participate in the equity issue, none will find their investment diluted. This is the only 
scenario where none of the existing shareholders will see their investment or ownership 
diluted. The new share price will reflect both the share price of the old shares and the issue 
price of the new discounted shares. Subscription rights in a rights issue are transferable to 
reduce dilution to existing investors who do not want to participate in the offering.    
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In the case of a private placement, a subgroup of investors may be invited to invest in the 
company. In any case there will be some existing shareholders that will find their investment 
diluted. To reduce this dilution effect, a private placement is sometimes followed by a 
“repair issue”. A repair issue is an additional private placement, most often given on equal 
terms to the original private placement, where existing shareholders who were not invited to 
participate in the original private placement are allowed to participate. 
A rich history of issuing equity on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
The importance of private placements on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) has been 
significant over a long period of time. Between 1997 and 2010 the number of private 
placements on the OSE totaled 1269, according to the Oslo Stock Exchange (2011). This 
number is higher than the actual number, however, due to errors in the reporting from the 
OSE.  
The majority of the private placements have been carried out within the last seven years, 
between 2004 and 2010. The number of rights issues between 1997 and 2010 has been far 
less than the observed number of private placements, totaling 257 over the period. In 
addition, the number of direct issues has been negligible over the period, contrary to what is 
observed on American stock exchanges. Figure 1 compares the number of private 
placements to the number of right issues between 1997 and 2010. Deposits to derivatives, 
equity certificates and placements with an insignificant value have been excluded.  
Private placements and rights issues on the OSE between 1997 and 2010 
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Over the period from 1997 to 2010 the share of private placements of the seasoned equity 
offerings at the OSE bottomed at 64.7% in 1999, while during the private placement surge 
from 2005 to 2007, the private placement share peaked at 94.8% in 2006. Overall, the share 
of private placements has increased in the latter part of the depicted period.  
Generally, rights issues are larger than private placements. The observed average size of 
private placements in the sample shown in Figure 1 is NOK 157mill, while the 
corresponding number for rights issues is NOK 525mill. Hence, the private placements 
average size is 30% of the size of rights issues. The relative size between the two different 
equity issues on the OSE is somewhat higher than what is found on other stock exchanges.  
In total, NOK 288bn has been issued throughout 1997-2010, with NOK 171bn being raised 
through private placements and NOK 117bn through rights issues, respectively. Between 
2004 and 2010, NOK 208bn has been raised, with NOK 134bn in private placements and 
NOK 74bn through rights issues. 
How private placements are carried out at the OSE 
Choosing a private placement allows for an easier process when issuing equity compared to 
a rights issue, due to a more straightforward book-building process and a smaller chance of 
information leakage. This reduces both the direct costs and the time needed to conduct an 
equity issue.  
A private placement on the OSE is typically carried out during the course of a single day, 
pursuant to an existing board authorization to increase the share capital by issuing new 
shares granted by the previous general meeting. If the board does not have an existing 
authorization or if the issued share capital exceeds the authorization, the private placement is 
completed conditional on the approval by an extraordinary general meeting. 
A general board authorization increases the flexibility of the firm’s management, particularly 
with regards to investments and acquisitions, since a general meeting is not necessary to 
approve the issue. Sometimes the authorization could also be used to defend against a hostile 
takeover or to control the ownership composition.   
The decision to grant the board of directors a mandate to increase a company’s share capital 
must be approved by two thirds of the shares represented at the general meeting and the 
authorization must be registered in the Register of Business Enterprises before it can be 
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applied. By law, the mandate must specify an upper ceiling on the authorization to increase 
the share capital, how long the authorization will be valid for, if the current shareholder’s 
preferential rights can be set aside, if the consideration for the shares must be cash and if the 
authorization can be used in a merger and/or acquisition. The board authorization is limited 
to 50 percent of the company’s current share capital and cannot be granted for more than two 
years.  
The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance 
The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance is issued by the Norwegian 
Corporate Governance Board (NUES). Companies listed at Oslo Stock Exchange are subject 
to comply with the code or explain deviations from it. The current version of the Norwegian 
Code of Practice restricts the use of board authorizations to issue new equity in the following 
way: 
Mandates granted to the board of directors to increase the company’s share capital should be 
restricted to defined purposes. If the general meeting is to consider mandates to the board of 
directors for the issue of shares for different purposes, each mandate should be considered 
separately by the meeting. Mandates granted to the board should be limited in time to no 
later than the date of the next annual general meeting. (NUES, 2011) 
Development of board authorizations 2004-2010 
Between 2004 and 2010 the Board of Directors of firms listed on the OSE firms were 
granted an authorization to issue new shares at 59% of the ordinary general meetings. This is 
equivalent to 692 instances out of 1170 general meetings in the period.  
Development of board authorizations 
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Figure 2 illustrates how the share of firms with this type of board authorization has been 
steadily increasing from 45% in 2004 to 68% in 2010, with a single drop in 2009. The 
development shows that most firms that start granting the Board of Directors with the 
authorization to issue additional equity continue to do this in following years. The upper 
ceiling on the size of the board authorizations is usually set at 10% of the current share 
capital; however, some boards request a significantly higher ceiling at the general meeting. 
1.3 Background Oslo Stock Exchange 
The following section is a review of the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). The section gives a 
brief introduction to the composition of the listed firms, including an overview of the 
industry segmentation and the size distribution. Then a description of the ownership 
concentration is provided. In the end this section elaborates on the holdings by different 
types of investors. These are key areas to interpret the results from the obtained data. The 
relative importance of the mechanisms at work with regards to private placements changes 
as the market changes.  
Composition of listed firms on the Oslo Stock Exchange  
The OSE is a unique stock exchange worldwide, due to the wide range of listed firms in 
historically strong Norwegian sectors such as oil, oil-service, shipping and seafood. The 
number of listed firms at the end of 2010 was 206, while the number has varied between 189 
and 242 in the period between 2004 and 2010. By the end of 2010, the OSE was the second 
largest stock exchange in the world with respect to the oil-service sector, while it is the 
world’s largest with respect to the shipping sector and the seafood sector. All measured by 
the number of listed firms. Other significant sectors present on the OSE are the 
manufacturing industry sector, the finance sector and the telecom sector. Each of these three 
sectors comprises roughly 10% of the market capitalization on the OSE.  
Many of the strong Norwegian sectors rely heavily on the development of the price of oil. 
This makes the OSE heavily reliant on one explanatory variable. The lack of diversification 
makes the OSE more volatile than most other stock exchanges. In addition, the OSE is more 
capital intensive than comparable stock exchanges. 
Ownership concentration 
Comparing the findings of Franks et al. (1993) and Døskeland and Mjøs (2008), the 
difference in the ownership stake of the single largest shareholder between the London Stock 
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Exchange and the OSE is significant. While more than 50 percent of the listed firms on the 
OSE in 2007 had a single owner holding more than 25% of the outstanding shares, the 
corresponding number for the London Stock Exchange in 1993 was 12.9%. Conversely, 
15.5% of the listed firms on the London Stock Exchange had the single largest shareholder 
holding less than 5% of the outstanding shares. On the OSE, the corresponding number was 
0.5%. In other words, only one firm on the OSE had the largest shareholder holding less than 
5%.  
Ownership share of largest shareholder in listed firms 
 
Table 1 
The differences noted above are found in comparison to other countries as well. While the 
observed ownership concentration on the London Stock Exchange resembles stock markets 
in the US, the concentration on the OSE resembles German and French stock markets. In 
Germany and France the single largest shareholder owns more than 25% of the outstanding 
shares in 80% and 85% of the listed firms, respectively, as shown by Franks and Mayer 
(1997).  
Investors 
The monitoring of a firm occurs in different forms and from different sources. The board of 
directors, auditors, banks, equity researchers, credit rating agencies and large shareholders 
are all potential monitors. These will actively monitor in order to strengthen the firm with 
respect to returns, growth and risk. This should positively affect the value of the firm. 
Nevertheless, the participants often have different incentives for monitoring. Banks have 
strong incentives to decrease risk and will seldom support risky projects. Shareholders, 
conversely, have incentives to accept risk in order to create value. However, not all 
shareholders are actively monitoring the management. 
Active shareholders participate in the day-to-day operations of the firm to support long-term 
value creation in investee firms. The use of resources to monitor and influence managers 
only makes sense if the holdings are large enough to justify the effort. As a result, active 
investors have larger holdings, limiting their ability to quickly sell their shares at any time. 
London, 1993 Oslo, 2007
< 5% 15.5% 0.5%
5 - 15% 58.1% 29.2%
15 - 25% 13.5% 20.0%
25 - 50% 11.6% 33.5%
> 50% 1.3% 16.8%
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In addition, active investors invest in a limited number of firms since they commit much of 
their time to monitor their investments. 
Conversely, passive investors play no particular role in firm affairs and they usually have a 
shorter investment horizon. Most international institutional investors and mutual funds are 
the prototype of a passive investor, since they have neither the time nor resources to 
influence the day-to-day operations of the firm. The international institutional investors 
primarily view their investments on the OSE as portfolio investments, intended to provide 
international diversification. The relatively short investment horizon of passive investors 
may not always be in the best interest of the firm’s long-term development.  
Døskeland and Mjøs (2008) find that the share of the OSE held by active shareholders has 
dropped from 45% in the mid 1990’s to 25% in 2007. Over this period, the interest from 
international institutional investors has increased, while individuals have reduced their share 
of directly owned Norwegian stocks in favor of mutual funds and internationally diversified 
portfolios. Foreign investors have increased their share from 28% at the start of 2004 to 35% 
at the end of 2010, and are now hold the largest ownership share of any group on the OSE. 
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2. Theory 
2.1 Capital structure and the choice of issuing equity 
Assuming perfect capital markets and an unchanged investment policy, the Modigliani-
Miller irrelevance proposition (Brealey and Myers, 2003) states that the choice of equity 
level does not impact shareholder wealth. In the Modigliani-Miller world, corporate leverage 
does not affect the total value of the firm, since investors can undo corporate leverage 
changes as long as they can borrow at the same rate as the firm.  
In the real world, however, taxes and bankruptcy costs introduce market imperfections. 
Because debt interest payments provide a tax shield, borrowing more can sometimes 
increase firm value. Bankruptcy costs, on the other hand, decrease the potential value 
creation when issuing debt. Since creditors factor in a potential bankruptcy when the 
company issues debt, the costs are ultimately borne by shareholders through a higher interest 
rate. Trade-off theory suggests that a company decides the amount of debt financing by 
balancing tax savings and bankruptcy costs. 
Pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) addresses additional considerations when a 
firm decides between debt and equity financing. Information asymmetry and agency costs 
lead to a ranking of additional financing. Primarily, internal financing is preferred to debt 
financing. Equity follows as a matter of last resort if the first two options are not available. 
According to the pecking order theory, the market response to an equity issue should 
therefore be negative, due to the signal it sends to investors. 
2.2 Private Placement Theories 
Numerous articles have attempted to explain the announcement effect of equity issues in 
different markets. Several of these contribute to the literature regarding private placements. 
Molin (1996) suggests that mechanisms that directly or indirectly translate into share price 
movements can be divided into three distinct effects: Agency-costs effects, information 
effects and price-pressure effects. Private placements of stock have historically been 
interpreted to be beneficial to existing shareholders. Most of the research on the topic 
regarding private placements has been favoring the monitoring and certification hypotheses. 
We will proceed to elaborate on the empirical implications of the major hypotheses in the 
following section. 
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Agency-costs effects 
Monitoring hypothesis 
Wruck (1989) suggests that purchasers of private placements of common stock are active 
investors that will monitor management closely. These investors will ensure that 
management maximizes value through better allocation of resources. The effect is most 
notable in firms with low ownership concentrations. This is consistent with Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), who find a positive reaction to private placements directed towards outside 
investors. They believe this share price reaction occurs due to investors’ belief that 
management will be monitored more closely. Moreover, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) 
add that if a purchaser of stock in the private placement has a substantial stake in the firm 
prior to the private placement, the share price reaction to the private placement will then 
include a reaction to the ownership increase by a potential acquirer of the firm. They 
conclude that the increased probability of a takeover bid induces a positive share price 
reaction. This is consistent with Wruck’s findings, as she finds that the abnormal returns 
from private placements are positively related to ownership changes when ownership 
concentration is high or low. However, she finds a negative reaction in the middle range of 
ownership concentration.  
Managerial entrenchment hypothesis 
The managerial-entrenchment hypothesis is an alternative hypothesis to the monitoring 
hypothesis. Weisbach (1988) says that managerial entrenchment occurs when managers gain 
so much power that they are able to use the firm to further their own interests rather than the 
interests of shareholders. Both Dann and DeAngelo (1988) and Wruck (1989) take some 
time to elaborate on this hypothesis. Dann and DeAngelo find that private placements are an 
efficient mechanism to reduce the potential threat from takeovers, while Wruck finds that the 
market reacts negatively to a private placement that leads a shareholder to a controlling 
position of the firm. Barclay et al. (2007) argue that management uses private placements to 
place stock in the hands of friendly investors. Thus, private placements dissuade bids from 
acquiring firms, decreasing the chance of a take-over. In most cases, this does not benefit the 
shareholders. 
Convergence-of-interest hypothesis 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) present a convergence-of-interest hypothesis. They believe that 
private placements in which management or other insiders increase their percentage 
ownership share will result in a positive share price reaction, while a private placement that 
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reduces their ownership share will result in a negative share price reaction.  The 
convergence-of-interests hypothesis expects that these share price reactions reflect the 
improving and the worsening alignment between shareholders and management. 
Redistribution of wealth 
Furthermore, Galai and Masulis (1976) note that a private placement restructures the firm’s 
financing. This will implicitly induce a redistribution of wealth between shareholders and 
debt holders. As the loan term agreements to the debt are fixed, the decreased risk in the firm 
will increase the value of the debt, thus reducing the wealth of the shareholders. According 
to this, they expect a negative share price reaction to follow an announcement of a private 
placement. 
Price-pressure effects 
The price-pressure hypothesis states that the demand for a stock is a downward sloping 
curve. This contradicts financial theory, which implies a perfectly elastic demand curve. 
Scholes (1972) argues that the demand curve should be downward sloping, as he finds that 
each share is unique and the market does not provide a perfect substitute. A private 
placement increases the supply of a share, decreasing the equilibrium price. 
Asquith and Mullins (1986) find that larger equity issues show a greater negative excess 
return on the day of announcement than smaller equity issues. This supports the hypothesis 
as the demand curve will make a larger shift in larger equity issues. However, Baghat and 
Frost (1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1986) do not find this relationship between the size of 
the equity issue and the announcement effect. Thus, the price-pressure hypothesis lacks 
consistent empirical support.  
Information effects 
Leland and Pyle (1977) reason that private placements where members of management 
increase their ownership fraction should induce a positive share price reaction. They argue 
that these issues signal asymmetric information between insiders and outside investors 
regarding future cash flows. They argue that management has extensive knowledge of the 
future, and thus they know when it is wise to increase their stakes in the firm. Later, Myers 
and Majluf (1984) tried to capture this asymmetric information in a model. They argued that 
the firm would issue public equity at a time when the firm is overvalued. Thus, new 
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investors would pay an excessively high price to the value they receive in return, while the 
wealth of existing investors is maximized.  
Hertzel and Smith (1993) further extended the model by Myers and Majluf to capture 
information effects. They argued that value certification by informed investors buying shares 
in a private placement should increase the share price. They found results consistent with 
both Leland and Pyle, and Myers and Majluf.  
Hertzel and Smith argue that the associated discount in private placements reflects the 
information costs borne by existing investors, while the abnormal share price return reflects 
the positive signal regarding firm value from management. However, the research was 
weighted towards growth firms on the NASDAQ stock exchange. Thus, the information 
regarding the firm’s value is excessively high compared to studies that focused on large and 
mature firms. 
Ross (1977) argues that the capital structure decision itself reveals information. He believes 
management will protect their positions by minimizing the risk of bankruptcy, and 
decreasing the financial leverage by issuing equity in a private placement conveys negative 
information with respect to future cash flows. Masulis (1983) expects the management to 
maximize the existing shareholders wealth in its decision-making. Given that information 
asymmetries exist between management and investors, the market will react negatively to a 
leverage-decreasing private placement of shares. In his model, he finds that an increase in 
leverage is positively related to changes in the share price, as investors expect a decrease in 
future earnings. Healy and Palepu (1990) suggest, on the other hand, that there is no 
subsequent drop in earnings after an equity issue relative to prior years’ earnings or to the 
firms’ industry earnings. In addition, they do not discover any drop in earnings forecasts by 
equity analysts subsequent to the equity issue. However, they find that asset betas and equity 
betas increase as leverage falls. This suggests increased earnings volatility subsequent to 
equity issues.  
Miller and Rock (1985) illustrate a third information effect. They look at equity issues as a 
compensation for a shortfall of internal cash flows. The signaling effect of the equity issue is 
related to a negative impact on firm value, as the drop in expected future cash flows exceed 
the value in making extra investments. 
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3. Data 
3.1 Determining the private placements sample 
The raw list of 937 unique private equity issues in the Norwegian stock market in the period 
2004-2010 was obtained from Oslo Stock Exchange’s webpage. The entries were then 
matched with information from the press releases in the Newsweb database in order to 
decide whether or not the private equity issues qualified as relevant private placements with 
cash settlements. Private placements that coincided with press releases judged to 
significantly impact the company’s share price, particularly announcements of acquisitions, 
contracts and issues of other types of securities were omitted from the sample. This resulted 
in 222 clean private placements with cash settlements. Table 2 shows the general 
classification of the 937 unique private equity issues. The classification explains the 
rationale to exclude the observation from the final sample. 
Classification of the unique equity issues entries between 2004 and 2010 
 
Table 2 
For the final sample of 222 private placements, qualitative and quantitative data was 
gathered. The Newsweb database provided the announcement date, issue price and shares 
issued, together with the firms’ stated reasons for issuing directed equity, and the type of 
investors they targeted. If the announcement was made after the stock market closed, the 
following trading day was selected as the announcement date as the next day would contain 
the reaction to the private placement announcement.  
3.2 Sample description 
Sample statistics 
The average size of the private placements in the sample was NOK 245 Million with a 
median of NOK 117 Million. On average, the relative issue size was 14.5% with a median of 
9.6%. Table 3 summarizes the statistics of the sample. 
Type Entries
Final sample of private placements 222
Share issue of acquisitions, earn-outs and contracts 240
Employee options 247
Warrants and rights issues 55
Coincides with financial restructuring, bond issues etc. 43
Coincides with significant announcements in the event window 30
Different type of equity issue (IPO, stock split, offering) 18
Insignificant value, Information uncertainty 79
No accurate stock price history 3
Total 937
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Size statistics 
 
Table 3 
This data suggests that it is common to issue ~10% of the company’s shares outstanding on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
Industry overview 
The mix of firms with private placements in the sample does not perfectly reflect the market 
capitalization the Oslo Stock Exchange. Table 4 and Figure 3 report the private placements 
sample divided by the firm’s Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) at the time of 
the equity issue. The number of private placements and the resulting share of the sample are 
then compared to each industry’s market capitalization share of the OSE over the sample 
period (Kvaal and Ødegaard, 2011).  
The sample divided by the Global Industry Classification Standard 
 
Table 4 
Industry share of private placements on the Oslo Stock Exchange (by total issue size) 
 
Figure 3 
Average Median
Issue size, gross proceeds (MNOK) 245 117
Firm size, pre-issue (MNOK) 3052 1035
Relative issue size (%) 14.5 % 9.6 %
Sector Market cap of private placements Market cap of OSE 2000-2010
10 Energy 67.9% 39.8 %
15 Materials 1.8% 2.6 %
20 Industrials 9.1% 13.3 %
25 Consumer Discretionary 2.6% 5.9 %
30 Consumer Staples 6.8% 6.4 %
35 Health Care 1.3% 3.9 %
40 Financials 3.8% 12.0 %
45 Information Technology 6.8% 5.8 %
50 Telecommunication services 0.0% 9.3 %
55 Utilities 0.0% 1.0 %
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The figure above shows that the energy industry constitutes the majority of the sample 
private placements, measured by total issue size (67.9%). The average market capitalization 
of the energy industry relative to the OSE during the last decade was 39.8%. In addition, 
since Statoil ASA makes up more than half of the energy industry on the OSE, and has not 
issued equity in the period, it is clear that small energy firms are overrepresented in the 
sample. 
The energy industry`s annual share of the sample (by issue size) 
 
Table 5 
Table 5 shows how the energy industry dominates the sample towards the end of the period. 
Lead by a surging oil service sector, the industry has grown through both equity issues and 
organic growth. In 2010, the energy sector constituted 82.5% of the sample, based on issue 
size, the highest share observed in the period. 
Although the information technology (IT) industry represents only 5.8% of the OSE during 
the sample period, IT firms conducted 49 out of the 222 private placements in the sample. 
This sector probably consists of a higher fraction of growth companies, with a relatively 
higher perceived need for capital. Still, based on total issue size, the IT industry constitutes 
only 6.8% of the sample.  
Annual overview 
The sample divided by issue year, as depicted by Table 6, indicates a higher level of activity 
in periods where the stock market is performing well.  
Annual number of private placements with cash settlements 
 
Table 6 
Year Energy industry
2004 21.3%
2005 38.6%
2006 76.3%
2007 59.5%
2008 75.5%
2009 64.4%
2010 82.5%
Year Private placements
2004 22
2005 41
2006 55
2007 38
2008 18
2009 25
2010 23
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The economic upturn up until the financial crisis resulted in a record high number of private 
placements with cash settlements. The maximum was reached in 2006, with 55 observations. 
The financial crisis made it more difficult to issue equity from 2008 and onward. The sample 
contains only 18 private placements from 2008 and all of them were conducted before the 
fall of Lehman Brothers.  
Figure 4 depicts the sample private placements with respect to the historical development of 
the Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX). Each red dot represents the 
announcement of a private placement. The figure reflects how the market for equity issues 
dried up after the 2008 financial crisis.  
Private placements with cash settlements on the OSE 
 
Figure 4 
The high frequency of private placements pre-crisis and low frequency post-crisis should not 
come as a surprise; it is both easier and more advantageous to issue equity when the market 
is booming. The period shortly after a crisis is often characterized by fear and uncertainty. 
This limits the number of firms that wants to issue equity, as existing shareholders are likely 
to find the firm undervalued. 
Company age 
Table 7 indicates that newly listed firms performed a significant number of the private 
placements in the sample, although somewhat mature firms – in their 5th year since listing or 
older – represent half of the sample. Newly listed firms often need capital to finance their 
growth prospects. In addition, there is conducted a fairly large number of private placements 
by firms in their first year since listing. This might be the result of fewer firms combining 
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the initial listing with an initial public offering. Instead, newly listed firms choose to conduct 
a private placement subsequent to the listing.  
Sample by age 
 
Table 7 
Stated purpose for the private placement 
The justifications for the private placements stated in the announcement press releases 
differed in their specificity among the firms in the sample. Some firms are very specific 
when explaining why they intend to issue more equity (and a few times even states why the 
preferential rights for existing shareholders are set aside), while other firms are very vague in 
their explanation for the intended use of the proceeds. Based on the wording in the private 
placement press release, the sample was divided into five categories, as shown in Table 8.  
Sample by stated purpose 
 
Table 8 
“Growth” and “Working Capital” include actions meant to increase the organic growth of 
the firm, while “Acquisitions” covers acquisitive growth. When the purpose is “Financial” it 
is often related to repayment of debt. “Other” covers the private placements where the stated 
purpose is vague, ambiguous or non-existing. 
Repair issues 
For the private placements followed by a repair issue, the announcement date and the 
relative size of the repair issue to the private placement was obtained. On average, 14% of 
the private placements were followed by a repair issue, as shown in Table 9. The relatively 
Years since listing Private placements
1st year 39
2nd year 30
3rd year 25
4th year 17
5th year or older 111
Stated purpose Observations Typical wording
Growth 114 "The purpose of the placement is to strengthen the equity of the company in
a growth phase and to take advantage of emerging strategic opportunities.”
Acquisitions 35 "The purpose of the private placement is to finance the previously
announced acquisition of the shares in company X.”
Financial 21 "The purpose of the private placement is to strengthen the company’s
balance sheet.”
Working Capital 13 The net proceeds of the private placement will be used to fund operational
initiatives and increased working capital requirements.
Other                         
(or no explanation)
39 "The proceeds from the private placement are for general corporate
purposes.” 
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low fraction of private placements followed by a repair issue supports the view that private 
placements might be disadvantageous to the existing shareholders who do not participate in 
the private placement. 
General statistics for repair issues 
 
Table 9 
The average intended size of the repair issue relative to the private placement was 27.9% 
with a median of 20.0%, however, the actual relative issue size turned out to be 18.4% on 
average with a median of 6.2%. The reason the actual issue size of some repair issues is 
lower than intended comes from the possibility that the share price might be lower than the 
issue price when the subscription period ends. A rational investor will then buy shares in the 
market, instead of subscribing at a higher price in a subsequent offering. 
Number of issues per firm 
The 222 observations in the sample consist of 98 unique companies, as shown in Table 10. 
About half of these companies appear one time in the sample, while the rest of the 
companies have issued shares in several private placements during the sample period.  
Recurring firms 
 
Table 10 
Sevan Marine AS and PA Resources AB both completed eight private placements, almost 
exclusively prior to the financial crisis. Global Geo Services AS (7), Norse Energy Corp. AS 
(6) and TTS Group AS (6) are also examples of so-called “serial offenders” during this 
boom period.  
Statistics
Private placements 222
Repair issues 31
Repair issues relative to private placements 14%
Average intended gross proceed per repair issue (MNOK) 71.7 (48.3)
Average actual gross proceeds after subscriptions (MNOK) 40.2 (18)
Average intended size of repair issue relative to private placement 27.9% (20.0 %)
Average actual size of repair issue relative to private placement 18.4% (6.2%)
Firms
1 issue 46
2 issues 24
3 issues 8
4 issues 6
5 issues 9
6 issues 2
7 issues 1
8 issues 2
Unique firms in sample 98
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4. Method 
4.1 Event Study 
An event study is conducted in order to analyze the share price reaction with respect to the 
announcement of a private placement. The vast amount of data material in the financial 
market makes an event study highly suitable to capture effects from newly acquired 
information such as announcements. MacKinley (1997) argues that the usefulness of such a 
study comes from the fact that, given rationality in the marketplace, the effects of an event 
will be reflected immediately in security prices. MacKinley further states that event study 
data can be divided into three distinct subgroups, depending on when the data was obtained 
relative to the specific event. He calls this the estimation window, the event window and the 
post-event window, depicted on a timeline below.  
 
This design illustrates that the data used in the estimation of parameters to the models 
relevant for the event study should not overlap with data from the event window itself.  With 
this in mind, the parameters will not have been influenced by the share price reactions close 
to the event. Thus, the design removes the possibility of having the abnormal returns 
observed around the announcement included in the estimated parameters themselves. This 
will increase the reliability of the observed effect in the event window. 
The length of the different windows is a highly debated topic. The estimation window must 
be applicable and current, thus some argue for a short estimation window of less than one 
year. Others argue for a longer estimation window of up to five years. The main argument 
behind this view is that the data must contain both longer positive and negative periods for 
the shares.  The event window should be long enough to capture the significant effect of the 
event, but short enough to exclude confounding effects, according to McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997). In addition, Brown and Wagner (1985) show that a long event window severely 
reduces the power of the test statistic. They further prove that this reduction leads to false 
inferences about the significance of the event. The post-event window is sometimes included 
as part of the estimation window to find the most applicable parameters. This is done when 
0
time
( event window ]( estimation window ] ( post-event window ]
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there are doubts regarding the reliability of the parameters found in the estimation window 
alone.  
Since this thesis includes both a short-run and a long-run event study, it is appropriate to 
choose different sets of timelines for each study. The choice of length of the different 
windows and the reasoning behind the choices are discussed in the two sections below.  
Short-run windows 
The short-run event window is set from 10 days prior to the event to 10 days after the event 
(-10,10). This defines the event day as day 0. Within this window, the focus will be on the 
announcement day (t=0) return of the issuing firm, and whether there is evidence of any 
positive or negative drifts before or after the private placement announcement.  
The short-run estimation window is set from 260 trading days prior to the event to 11 trading 
days prior to the event (-260,-11). This approximately corresponds to a calendar year. The 
relatively long estimation window is chosen to ensure that the parameters of the model are 
relevant, and that the results have high statistical power. The estimation window is closed 11 
days prior to the private placement to make sure potential information leakages to the market 
do not reduce the quality of the estimated parameters.  
Long-run windows 
In the long-run study, the event window is set from 250 days prior to the event to 750 days 
after the event (-250,750). This makes it possible to investigate the share price performance 
of the issuing firm in the period between one year prior to and three years after the private 
placement announcement.  
Since the event window includes 250 days prior to the event, the estimation window is set 
from 500 trading days prior to the event to 251 trading days prior to the event (-500,-251). 
The reasoning behind the choice of this estimation window is the same as for the short-run 
study.  
4.2 Estimating abnormal returns 
Standard event study methodology is used to estimate abnormal returns, ARit, for security i 
at trading day t relative to the event. Abnormal returns are measured by observing security 
return Rit relative to risk-adjusted normal return NRt, as shown by the equation below. 
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𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑁𝑅𝑡 
The normal return, NRt, for firm i’s share at time t, is defined as the expected return without 
conditioning on the event taking place, or, in other words, the return on the share if the event 
had not occurred. 
Three different normal returns metrics were used to estimate abnormal returns  
• Market-adjusted normal returns 
• Market-model normal returns (CAPM) 
• Factor-model normal returns (Fama-French) 
Market returns 
As a proxy for the market return, we employ the Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index 
(OSEBX). The OSEBX is a total return index consisting of a representative selection of all 
the shares listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is a pricing model for both individual securities and 
portfolios. The model states that investors should only be rewarded for taking on non-
diversifiable risk, measured by the market beta (β). The CAPM is given by the following 
formula: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓) 
E(Ri) represents the expected period return on security i, Rf the risk free rate and Rm the 
expected return of the market. The beta describes the relationship between the security return 
Ri and the market return Rm, or more precisely the relative correlation between the two. The 
formula for estimating the beta of security i is given below. 
𝛽𝑖 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖, 𝑟𝑚)𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑚)  
Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
Fama and French (1993) added two additional factors to the CAPM. Based on empirical 
evidence that two classes of stocks – namely small caps and value stocks – historically 
performed better than the rest of the market, Fama and French (1993) extended the CAPM to 
reflect an investment’s exposure to “size” and “value”. The Fama-French three-factor model 
is given by this formula: 
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𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝑓) +  𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 × 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿 × 𝐻𝑀𝐿 
SMB stands for “small minus big”, and refers to the return on a portfolio of long positions in 
stocks with a small market capitalization and short positions in stocks with a big market 
capitalization.  βSMB is the estimated relative correlation between security i and the SMB-
portfolio. HML stands for “high minus low” and refers to the return on a portfolio of long 
positions in value stocks (high book-to-market ratio) and short positions in growth stocks 
(low book-to-market ratio). βi is similar to the market beta from the CAPM, although it is 
now calculated simultaneously with βSMB and βHML.  
The inclusion of the “size” factor in the model refers to empirical evidence indicating that 
investments in small firms on average results in a positive risk-adjusted abnormal return 
relative to investments in large firms. According to Dimson and Marsh (1999), the size effect 
is the most documented stock market deviation in the world. The inclusion of the “value” 
factor was based on the observation by Fama and French (1992) that firms with a relatively 
high book-to-market ratio have a systematic higher market-model adjusted return than firms 
with a relatively low book-to-market ratio.  
Both of these effects have been widely discussed during the last decade, and the size effect 
especially has proved to be very sensitive to the choice of estimation period. Næs et al. 
(2008) found the “market” and “size” factors to be relevant for the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
The “value” factor was estimated to be irrelevant. 
Model specifications 
Market adjusted  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
Market-model adjusted 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 
Fama-French adjusted 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖𝑚𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑅𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑅𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 
To calculate arithmetic daily returns Rit for share i at trading day t, events and dividends-
adjusted equity prices are obtained from “Børsprosjektet NHH”.  
4.3 Estimating the parameters of the normal return models 
The linear regression model parameters are estimated in the estimation window with an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedure. The OLS method minimizes the sum of squared 
residuals between observed values and the values predicted by the linear approximation. 
Both the beta coefficient of the market model and the market beta of the Fama-French model 
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are estimated by a regression of Rit on Rmt. Since the three coefficients of the Fama-French 
model are estimated simultaneously, the market beta, 𝛽𝑖𝑚, will differ from the one estimated 
in the market model. The SMB- and HML-beta estimations are based on regressing Rit on 
the returns of Ødegaard’s (2011) SMB and HML factor series for the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
As a result of different estimation periods for the short-run and long-run studies, two sets of 
beta coefficients were estimated. The short-run beta coefficients are estimated based on 250 
daily observations in the interval between 260 days before the event and up to 11 days prior 
to the event, while the long-run beta coefficients are based on 250 observations in the 
interval between 500 days before to 251 days before the event.  
4.4 Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns 
In order to be able to draw overall inferences, the abnormal returns must be aggregated over 
the sample. To compute sample statistics, abnormal returns were first aggregated across each 
day t in the event window. The average abnormal return formula is given below. The median 
abnormal return and the percentage of positive observations were also calculated.  
𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 1𝑁�𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Abnormal returns are cumulated for each share i from trading day τ1 to trading day τ2, in 
order to compute CARi(τ1,τ2). Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each share i are then 
aggregated across the sample to estimate sample CARt(τ1,τ2). The following formula 
illustrates this process, where CAR(τ1,τ2) is the average cumulative abnormal return between 
time τ1 and τ2 averaged across the sample. The median cumulative abnormal return and the 
percentage positive cumulative abnormal returns were also calculated.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = 1𝑁�� 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝜏2
𝑡=𝜏1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
Daily versus monthly stock returns 
As summarized by Brown and Warner (1994), the use of daily stock returns presents a 
number of potential problems when conducting an event study. Fama (1976) showed that the 
distribution of daily stock returns generally have fatter tails than the normal distribution, and 
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Brown and Warner found this to also hold true for abnormal returns. Daily abnormal returns 
also exhibit autocorrelation, or serial dependence.  
Brown and Warner conclude that methodologies based on the OLS market model and 
standard parametric tests are generally well specified with the use of daily data. However, 
their study focuses on short-run event studies. To account for the autocorrelation present in 
daily abnormal returns, monthly abnormal returns are used for the long-run event study, 
unless stated otherwise. This also helps to reduce the potential problem of low trading 
volumes and little liquidity for some of the sample stocks.  
Test-statistics 
To test whether the cumulative abnormal returns significantly differ from zero, standard test 
statistics are applied, assuming normally distributed abnormal returns. With a null 
hypothesis of a zero mean, the t-statistic is computed as the number of standard errors the 
sample average abnormal return departs from zero.  
𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑠
               𝑠 = � 1
𝑁 − 1�(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑅𝑡)2𝑁
𝑖=1
 
The formulas above specify how the t-values are calculated for abnormal returns. The same 
formulas are applicable to cumulative abnormal returns. The sample standard deviation is 
represented by s.  
Sample tests will be performed at the 5% level, meaning that the probability of rejecting the 
null hypothesis when the true mean is in fact zero is 5%. If the true mean of the sample is 
zero, the chances of observing a sample t-statistic with an absolute value larger than 1.96 is 
5%. Thus +/-1.96 are the rejection limits, unless stated otherwise.  
Winsorizing 
Due to a limited sample size and high dispersion in the data, particularly for the long-run 
study, a winsorized mean suggested by Tukey (1962) is employed to reduce the influence of 
large, possible spurious outliers. “Winsorizing” means to set the bottom 5% observations 
equal to the 5th percentile and the top 5% observations equal to the 95th percentile, then 
averaging across the sample. This method increases the stability of the long-run test statistics 
significantly.  
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5. Results 
As described in the preceding section, slightly different methods were used for short-run and 
long-run results. While the short-run event study employs generally accepted event study 
methodology, the methods used for the long-run event study are more controversial. The 
choice of a normal return model for longer horizons is a widely discussed subject. The 
challenges faced when conducting long-run event studies will be discussed more thoroughly 
later.  
Section 5.1 portrays the result of the short-run event study. The abnormal returns reported 
are based on daily return data, and as a check for robustness both the market model and the 
market index are used as normal return models.  
Section 5.2 reports the long-run results, based on monthly return data for the reasons 
mentioned in section 4. In addition to the market model adjusted abnormal returns, Fama-
French and sector index adjusted abnormal returns are reported as a check for robustness. 
The winsorized mean was used as the test statistic for the long-run event study to reduce 
problems with large outliers.  
5.1 Short-run results 
Sample short-run results 
The results from the event study on announcement effect of private placements on the OSE 
are summarized in Table 11-Table 13. Table 11 shows the abnormal return results using the 
beta-adjusted market model (CAPM) as the benchmark, while Table 12 shows an alternative 
approach using the market index (OSEBX). Since the results do not seem sensitive to the 
choice of benchmark, the beta-adjusted market model will be referred to as the benchmark 
unless stated otherwise. Table 13 summarizes the cumulative abnormal returns statistics. 
Share price return vs. beta-adjusted market model (CAPM) 
 
Table 11 
N = 222 AR(-5) AR(-4) AR(-3) AR(-2) AR(-1) AR(0) AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4) AR(5)
Average 0.1 % 0.7 % 0.4 % 0.6 % 1.0 % -1.51% 0.1 % -0.6 % 0.0 % -0.1 % -0.2 %
Median 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.1 % -1.17% -0.1 % -0.5 % -0.3 % -0.3 % -0.3 %
% Positive 50% 53% 52% 50% 52% 36% 49% 38% 42% 42% 44%
P-value 0.63586 0.00809 0.12151 0.04778 0.00568 0.00026 0.70438 0.10076 1.00707 1.31653 0.72550
t-value 0.47             2.65             1.55             1.98        2.77        -3.60      0.38        -3.07       -0.01       -0.50       -1.19       
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Share price return vs. market index (OSEBX) 
 
Table 12 
Cumulative abnormal returns 
 
Table 13 
The average announcement effect to private placements on the OSE is -1.51% (median:  
-1.17%), significant at the 1% level. All of the pre-event day abnormal returns are positive. 
AR(-4), AR(-2) and AR(-1) are all significant at the 5% level.  
In the days before the announcement of a private placement, the abnormal returns are evenly 
distributed between positive and negative returns among the firms in the sample. However, 
after the announcement, the sample is clearly skewed towards negative abnormal returns, 
with approximately 60% negative observations. In addition, this result is consistent for the 
event day itself, where the data shows 64% negative abnormal returns.  
The apparent positive drift in the days before the announcement of a private placement, and 
the negative drift in the days after, is supported by measures of cumulative abnormal returns 
for the pre-event and post-event periods. The cumulative abnormal return for the four days 
before the announcements, CAR[-5,-1], is 2.87% (0.75% median) and highly significant. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the median is close to zero. The same measure for the 
event day and the following five days shows a -3.04% (-4.35%) and significant at the 5% 
level. However, when the abnormal return on the event day is removed, the post-
announcement cumulative abnormal return, CAR[1,5], is not significant.  
The P-values in Table 11 indicate that AR(-4), AR(-2), AR(-1), AR(0) and AR(2) are 
statistically significant at the 5% level, while the other observed short-run abnormal returns 
are not significant. The abnormal returns are significant at the 5% level when the t-values are 
above 1.96 or below -1.96.  
N = 222 AR(-5) AR(-4) AR(-3) AR(-2) AR(-1) AR(0) AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4) AR(5)
Average 0.2 % 0.6 % 0.3 % 0.6 % 1.0 % -1.52% 0.1 % -0.5 % 0.1 % -0.1 % -0.2 %
Median -0.1 % 0.2 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.1 % -1.16% -0.1 % -0.5 % -0.2 % -0.5 % -0.3 %
% Positive 50% 54% 51% 50% 53% 38% 48% 40% 44% 42% 44%
P-value 0.54548 0.01105 0.18832 0.05156 0.00558 0.00026 0.66168 0.00795 0.82629 0.50089 0.17457
t-value 0.60             2.54             1.32             1.95        2.77        -3.65      0.44        -2.65       0.22        -0.67       -1.36       
N = 222 CAR[-5,-1] CAR[0,5] CAR[1,5]
Average 2.9 % -2.3 % -0.8 %
Median 0.8 % -3.2 % -1.2 %
% Positive 56% 34% 38%
P-value 0.00000 0.04735 1.55431
t-value 4.63             -3.64           -1.52           
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Observed t-values in the short-run event window 
 
Figure 5 
As the short-run period is extended, the observed positive drift prior to the event and the 
negative drift after the event are even more evident. The significant positive share price 
performance in the period leading up to the private placement supports the view that 
management issues equity when they think the firm is overvalued, as indicated by the 
observed t-values of the abnormal returns prior to the event in Figure 5. It is possible private 
placements are perceived as a negative signal by the market, contributing to the significant 
negative share price reaction observed following a private placement.  
Adjusting for the private placement discount 
In a private placement, the subscription price typically deviates from the current share price. 
Most often it is priced at a discount, however, it can happen that the subscription price comes 
with a premium. The size of the discount/premium will affect the reaction of the stock 
market due to the dilution suffered by existing shareholders.  
Any rational investor in a share transaction will include the dilution effect in the investment 
decision. Thus, the close price on the announcement day seems to be the best comparison 
when estimating the deviation, whether it is a discount or a premium. 
Discount statistics 
 
Table 14 
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Average discount to event day close price (median) -3.3% (-2.2%)
Number of private placements with a discount 162 (73%)
Number of private placements with a premium 41 (18%)
Number of private placements with close equal to subscription price 19 (9%)
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As summarized in Table 14, the sample shows an average discount of -3.3%. This is within 
the range of observed discounts at comparable European stock exchanges. Close to three out 
of four placements are priced lower than the event day close price. In 19 out of the 222 
observations the close price on the event day is equal to the subscription price in the private 
placement, while 41 private placements are issued with a premium. To adjust for dilution, 
we employ the discount-adjusted abnormal return formula proposed by Wruck (1989).  
𝐴𝑅0
𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 𝐴𝑅0 + 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 ∗ (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒0 − 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒−1  
The adjusted share price reaction should then reflect any changes in how investors view the 
company as a result of the private placement announcement.  
Discount-adjusted share price reaction 
 
Table 15 
Table 15 shows the result of this adjustment on the announcement effect. The discount-
adjusted average announcement effect is still -0.75%, though only significant at the 10% 
level. However, a -0.95% median adjusted share price reaction does indicate that most 
private placement announcements are perceived as containing negative information 
regarding firm valuation. 
Private placements announcement effects by stated purpose 
In the press releases for the private placement, the firms must justify why the raised equity is 
needed. These statements have been generalized into five categories: Growth, Acquisitions, 
Financial, Working Capital (WC) and Other. 
AR(0) by stated purpose 
 
Table 16 
N = 222 AR (0) Adj. AR (0)
Average -1.51% -0.75 %
Median -1.17% -0.95%
% Positive observations 36 % 43 %
P-value 0.00026 0.09952%
Growth Acquisitions Financial WC Other All
Number of observations 114 35 21 13 39 222
Average -0.97% -1.38% -6.03% -1.54% -0.75% -1.52%
Median -1.08% -1.27% -2.31% -1.09% -0.77% -1.16%
% Positive observations 37% 34% 24% 38% 38% 38%
P-value 0.04459 0.01429 0.03610 0.31355 0.33360 0.00026
t-value -2.01 -2.45 -2.10 -1.01 -0.97 -3.65
Average discount -3.65% -4.43% -3.00% -2.60% -3.41% 3.27%
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The different categories show different announcement effects in the sample, as shown in 
Table 16. The numbers above are not adjusted for share dilution, but the reported average 
discounts do not indicate any systematic differences in the size of discounts between the 
subsamples.  
The Financial category stands out among the different categories with an average -6.0% 
announcement effect. The median -2.3% shows that the Financial category contains a few 
large negative share price reactions, however, the median is still close to twice as large as 
any other category in the sample. The Financial category also contains the lowest percentage 
of firms with a positive abnormal share price reaction (24%). The Financial category is still 
only significant at the 5% level, which is explained by the low sample size and the high 
variance. The small sample size within the Financial category follows from the original 
exclusion of private placements that coincide with other types of fundraising, such as 
convertible bonds. 
The results for the categories Growth, Acquisitions, Working Capital and Other are all very 
similar to those found for the entire sample, with a negative ~1% abnormal return on the 
announcement day.  
Adjusted for private placement discount, none of the five categories show a significant 
abnormal return, as reported in Table 17. The results still indicate that the market reaction is 
stronger for private placement announcements motivated by financial restructuring, though 
the small sample sizes make it unwise to draw any conclusions.  
Discount-adjusted share price reaction by stated purpose 
 
Table 17 
Before and after the financial crisis 
The composition of the sample changed through the period. From 2004 to 2008 up to the 
financial crisis, the share of private placements in the Financial category in the sample was 
7%, while in 2009-2010 the share had increased to 18%. The small number of observations 
in the financial category makes it hard to draw any conclusions, other than the basic 
Growth Acquisitions Financial WC Other All
Number of observations 114 35 21 13 39 222
Average -0.23% -1.06% -3.22% -1.42% -0.42% -0.75%
Median -0.77% -0.83% -2.04% -0.89% -0.84% -0.95%
% Positive observations 46% 43% 29% 38% 44% 43%
P-value 0.65842 0.07172 0.33046 0.35709 0.60307 0.09952
t-value -0.44 -1.80 -0.97 -0.92 -0.52 -1.65
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economic interpretation that more firms would need financial restructuring after the financial 
turmoil. However, the increased share of private placements by financially distressed firms 
after the financial crisis does seem to have had a negative impact on the average abnormal 
returns. These data are summarized in Table 18. 
Announcement effect by period 
 
Table 18 
Following to the financial turmoil, the market reaction to private placements is -4.3%, 
compared to -0.8% prior to the financial turmoil. The discounted adjusted average shows a 
similar pattern with a -3.0% relative to -0.2%. For the simple average the result for both 
periods are significant at the 5% level. Moreover, when the adjustment from the share price 
dilution is taken into account, only the negative announcement effect in 2009-2010 is 
perceived to contain negative information. The adjusted announcement effect from 2009-
2010 is significant at the 1% level. It seems likely that the higher sense of uncertainty in the 
market in the post-crisis slump of 2009-2010 contributed to a more negative perception of 
private placement announcements. 
5.2 Long-run results 
Sample long-run results 
The abnormal share price movement in the sample in the year leading up to the private 
placement displays a clear increasing trend, with a 28.6% cumulative abnormal share price 
return. Averaged across the sample, 40 of the 50 days prior to the private placement show a 
positive abnormal share price return. Most of the positive cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) are observed within the last half year prior to the private placement announcement. 
The event day constitutes the top point on the graph. After the event, the average cumulative 
abnormal return the following year is -6.1% (-7.5%). The abnormal return subsequent to the 
event day continues to fall over a three-year period, as shown in Figure 6.  
2004-2008 2009-2010
Number of observations 177 45
Average AR(0) -0.8 % -4.3 %
Median AR(0) -0.8 % -3.0 %
% Positive observations 38% 24%
P-value 0.04982 0.00045
t-value -1.96              -3.51                
Financial 13 8
% Financial 7% 18%
Average discount adjusted AR(0) -0.2 % -3.0 %
Average discount -3.5 % -4.0 %
P-value 0.72447 0.00520
t-value -0.35              -2.79                
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Long-run cumulative abnormal return1) 
 
Figure 6 
1) Daily observations averaged across the sample 
The cumulative abnormal returns (based on monthly observations) are presented in Table 19. 
The CAR(1,125), CAR(1,500) and CAR(1,750) are all significant at the 5% level. However, 
the interpretation of the results become less clear as the event window is extended. A long-
run study with the event study methodology becomes a simultaneous test of the model and 
the results. Thus, an analysis over several years can at most indicate a trend. Over the three 
year period, the number of observations fell to 131 from the original 222 private placements 
in the sample. Thus, the mix of firms in the sample is highly altered. The sample for 
CAR(1,750) includes only the firms with a private placement between 2004 and 2007, still 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange three years after their observed private placement. All 
private placements in this sample occurred before the financial crisis. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAPM) 
 
Table 19 
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CAR(-250,750)
CAR(-250,-1) AR(0) CAR(1,125) CAR(1,250) CAR(1,500) CAR(1,750)
Number of observations 181                 222                 212                 193                 157                 131                 
Average 28.6 % -1.5 % -5.4 % -6.1 % -16.1 % -18.0 %
Median 18.8 % -1.1 % -7.1 % -7.5 % -13.7 % -19.7 %
% Positive observations 69% 37% 40% 44% 43% 44%
P-value 0.00000 0.00033 0.02100 0.15495 0.01097 0.04478
t-value 6.11                -3.59              -2.31              -1.42              -2.54              -2.01              
Annualized average 28.6 % -10.8 % -6.1 % -8.0 % -6.0 %
Annualized median 18.8 % -14.2 % -7.5 % -6.8 % -6.6 %
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The sharpest decline in the cumulative abnormal returns is observed within the first six 
months of the private placement announcement, as the annualized cumulative abnormal 
return is -10.8% (-14.2%) over the first half year subsequent to the event.  
Table 20-Table 21 show the cumulative abnormal returns when applying the Fama-French-
model abnormal returns and the sector index adjusted abnormal returns, respectively. Note, 
however, that Næs et al. (2007) find the Fama-French model to be less applicable for the 
Norwegian stock market than for other stock markets. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (Fama-French-model) 
 
Table 20 
Cumulative abnormal returns (Sector index) 
 
Table 21 
The different approaches do not significantly alter the results from the observed short-run 
results. Thus, the following analyses will be based on the market-model abnormal returns. 
Sample divided by market capitalization 
The positive development in cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) within the last year prior to 
the private placement announcement are significant at the 1% level for both the largest 50 
percent of firms and the smallest 50 percent of firms in the sample, measured by market 
capitalization on the day prior to the announcement. However, differences still exist between 
the groups, as depicted in Figure 7.  
CAR(-250,-1) AR(0) CAR(1,125) CAR(1,250) CAR(1,500) CAR(1,750)
Number of observations 181                 222                 212                 193                 157                 131                 
Average 24.5 % -1.2 % -7.0 % -8.6 % -19.2 % -21.5 %
Median 17.4 % -1.1 % -7.7 % -11.6 % -16.4 % -22.0 %
% Positive observations 64% 36% 37% 41% 42% 40%
P-value 0.00000 0.00000 0.00346 0.05308 0.00368 0.01907
t-value 5.16                -4.76              -2.92              -1.93              -2.90              -2.34              
Annualized average 24.5 % -14.0 % -8.6 % -9.6 % -7.2 %
Annualized median 17.4 % -15.5 % -11.6 % -8.2 % -7.3 %
CAR(-250,-1) AR(0) CAR(1,125) CAR(1,250) CAR(1,500) CAR(1,750)
Number of observations 181                 222                 212                 193                 157                 131                 
Average 24.2 % -1.1 % -4.1 % -4.9 % -23.4 % -28.5 %
Median 16.3 % -0.9 % -6.3 % -5.0 % -19.8 % -21.0 %
% Positive observations 68% 42% 40% 46% 36% 44%
P-value 0.00000 0.00002 0.06123 0.23715 0.00027 0.00117
t-value 5.49                -4.26              -1.87              -1.18              -3.64              -3.25              
Annualized average 24.2 % -8.2 % -4.9 % -11.7 % -9.5 %
Annualized median 16.3 % -12.6 % -5.0 % -9.9 % -7.0 %
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Cumulative abnormal returns by size  
 
Figure 7 
 
The smallest 50 percent of firms in the sample show an average annualized cumulative 
abnormal return of 39.2% (24.0% median) over the year prior to the private placement, while 
the largest 50 percent show a 17.2% (15.5%) cumulative abnormal return over the same 
period. Thus, the smallest 50 percent of firms outperform the largest 50 percent of firms 
leading up to the private placement; however, in the months leading up to the equity issue, 
the two samples develop similarly, as depicted in Figure 7. 
Subsequent to the private placement announcement, the groups show clear divergent trends. 
The smallest 50 percent of firms by market capitalization do not show any clear positive or 
negative trend after the private placement announcement. Even though the first year shows 
more negative returns than positive, this characteristic disappears in the CAR(1,500) and the 
CAR(1,750). None of the post-issue cumulated abnormal returns are significant at the 5% 
level. Conversely, the largest 50 percent of firms display a negative trend, where all the post-
issue cumulated abnormal returns are significant at the 5% level. Throughout the three years 
subsequent to the private placement announcement, the largest 50 percent of firms show an 
annualized average cumulative abnormal return of approximately -17%. The first half year 
post-issue shows an annualized average cumulative abnormal return of -23.1% (-18.7%). 
The results are summarized in Table 22. 
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Cumulative abnormal returns by size  
 
Table 22 
Without looking at underlying factors, it is difficult to interpret these results. The relative 
outperformance by the smallest firms in the sample, both before and after the private 
placement announcement, might be a result of smaller firms generally offering a higher 
return, as observed by Fama and French (1993). However, as shown above, the use of the 
Fama-French model did not significantly alter the results in this thesis.  
The observed share price development observed for the smallest 50 percent of firms in the 
sample, are similar to those expected in an efficient market. Equity is issued after a growth 
period, and after the equity issue the return to the investors is not abnormal.  
One possible explanation for the extreme negative performance by the largest 50 percent of 
firms in the sample after the equity issue could be extra ”attention” from investment banks, 
since larger companies tend to be more lucrative customers. The private placements 
undertaken by smaller firms might be more necessary than the ones conducted by the largest 
firms.  
Because of the small sample size, the large differences between the subsamples could also be 
spurious, or a result of other factors, such as firms or industries represented. The results 
could also be specific to the observed time period.  
Sample divided by price-to-book ratio 
The sample was split in half dependent on the price-to-book ratio of the stocks 250 days 
prior to the private placement. The group with the highest 50 percent price-to-book ratios is 
50%  Smallest firms CAR(-250,-1) AR(0) CAR(1,125) CAR(1,250) CAR(1,500) CAR(1,750)
Number of observations 90                    90             86                  77                  61                  48                  
Average 39.2 % -1.8 % -3.2 % -4.2 % 3.0 % 7.4 %
Median 24.0 % -1.4 % -9.3 % -7.5 % 3.1 % 7.4 %
% Positive 69% 37% 37% 40% 52% 52%
P-value 0.00000 0.00176 0.53180 0.62750 0.83506 0.64153
t-value 5.29                 -3.13         -0.63              -0.49              0.21               0.47               
Annualized average 39.2 % -6.4 % -4.2 % 1.5 % 2.5 %
Annualized median 24.0 % -18.6 % -7.5 % 1.6 % 2.5 %
50%  Largest firms CAR(-250,-1) AR(0) CAR(1,125) CAR(1,250) CAR(1,500) CAR(1,750)
Number of observations 91                    91             86                  77                  61                  49                  
Average 17.2 % -2.1 % -11.5 % -17.2 % -34.5 % -55.1 %
Median 15.5 % -1.0 % -9.3 % -16.6 % -23.5 % -31.6 %
% Positive 69% 37% 36% 45% 34% 33%
P-value 0.00123 0.00559 0.00004 0.00113 0.00005 0.00030
t-value 3.23                 -2.77         -4.09              -3.26              -4.06              -3.62              
Annualized average 17.2 % -23.1 % -17.2 % -17.3 % -18.4 %
Annualized median 15.5 % -18.7 % -16.6 % -11.7 % -10.5 %
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called “growth stocks”, while the group with the lowest 50 percent price-to-book ratios is 
called “value stocks”. However, the overall sample is relatively rich on growth stock 
observations. Thus, the “value stocks” includes both value stocks and the growth stocks with 
the lowest book-to-market ratios. The numbers are not adjusted for the relative price-to-book 
ratio on the Oslo Stock Exchange at the time of the observation. 
Both samples show a significant positive cumulative abnormal return in the year prior to the 
private placement. The value stocks show a 44.8% (43.3%) cumulative abnormal return the 
year prior to the private placement. The high return number is supported by the observed 
median and the fact that 76% of the observations in the sample show a positive return. The 
growth stocks on the other hand show a 12.9% (8.1%) cumulative abnormal return the year 
prior to the private placement. These observations are depicted in Figure 8 below. 
Cumulative abnormal returns by price-to-book ratio 
 
Figure 8 
After the private placement, the value stocks do not diverge significantly from the expected 
return given by the market model.  The growth stocks, however, show a severe and 
prolonged drop subsequent to the private placement. The first year after the private 
placement they had a -25.4% (-29.9%) cumulative abnormal return. By the end of the first 
six months after the private placement, the abnormal rise in stocks prior to the private 
placement is reversed. The steepest drop in cumulative abnormal returns is observed in the 
first half year after the private placement. The negative annualized share price return falls 
over the time.  In addition, only about 30% of the observed cumulative abnormal returns are 
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positive over the sample period for the growth stocks, and by the end of the three years 
subsequent to the private placement, the average firm in the group of growth stocks has lost 
49.8 percent of its value. These statistics are summarized in Table 23. 
Cumulative abnormal returns by price-to-book ratio 
 
Table 23 
Similar to when the sample was divided by market capitalization, there seems to be large 
differences between the subsamples. The growth stocks in the sample underperformed 
drastically compared to value stocks. This could be a result of differences in risk not picked 
up by the market model. However, it might also be a result of growth firms being hit 
particularly hard by the financial crisis of 2008, influencing those CAR-measures 
overlapping the crisis.  
Sample divided by Small/Large and Growth/Value 
The observed differences between the smallest and largest firms as well as between growth 
stock and value stock are somewhat puzzling. This is particularly true since the results from 
the Fama-French model do not significantly differ from the results obtained through CAPM.  
Table 24-Table 27 divide the sample into four subgroups, first by market capitalizations, 
then by price-to-book-ratios. Although the sample sizes are very limited, Table 24 indicates 
that the small value stocks in the sample performed extremely well both in the years before 
and after the private placement announcement. This could be a result of outliers, or perhaps 
these types of firms actually have better motives for conducting private placements. The rest 
of the sample subgroups seem to be in line with the results for the entire sample. Due to the 
50%  lowest price-to-book CAR(-250,-1) AR(0) CAR(1,125) CAR(1,250) CAR(1,500) CAR(1,750)
Number of observations 87                    87             82                  74                  58                  46                  
Average 44.8 % -2.3 % 0.8 % 0.7 % 2.1 % 1.2 %
Median 43.3 % -1.4 % -3.8 % -1.0 % 4.1 % 19.7 %
% Positive 76% 36% 44% 50% 53% 54%
P-value 0.00000 0.00166 0.85747 0.92700 0.87516 0.95000
t-value 6.82                 -3.14         0.18               0.09               0.16               0.06               
Annualized average 44.8 % 1.7 % 0.7 % 1.0 % 0.4 %
Annualized median 43.3 % -7.7 % -1.0 % 2.0 % 6.6 %
50%  highest price-to-book CAR(-250,-1) AR(0) CAR(1,125) CAR(1,250) CAR(1,500) CAR(1,750)
Number of observations 87                    87             83                  74                  58                  47                  
Average 12.9 % -1.7 % -17.5 % -25.4 % -41.2 % -49.8 %
Median 8.1 % -1.1 % -16.0 % -29.9 % -30.0 % -31.6 %
% Positive 62% 38% 29% 34% 31% 32%
P-value 0.04185 0.00949 0.00000 0.00004 0.00002 0.00013
t-value 2.04                 -2.59         -5.67              -4.12              -4.26              -3.82              
Annualized average 12.9 % -34.9 % -25.4 % -20.6 % -16.6 %
Annualized median 8.1 % -31.9 % -29.9 % -15.0 % -10.5 %
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limited sample sizes when the sample is divided into four, weight will not be put upon these 
results in the following analysis, although the apparently large differences between 
subgroups in the sample are noteworthy and worthy of further research.  
Small/Growth 
 
Table 24 
Small/Value 
 
Table 25 
Large/Growth 
 
Table 26 
Large/Value 
 
Table 27 
 
CAR(-250,-1) AR(0) CAR(1,125) CAR(1,250) CAR(1,500) CAR(1,750)
Number of observations 44                   44             43                   42                   38                   32                   
Average 28.5 % -1.8 % -20.3 % -28.3 % -39.8 % -49.6 %
Median 8.1 % -2.8 % -15.7 % -16.2 % -24.1 % -23.0 %
% Positive observations 61% 30% 23% 26% 39% 41%
P-value 0.01390 0.00027 0.00003 0.00153 0.00569 0.01309
t-value 2.46                -3.64         -4.15              -3.17              -2.77              -2.48              
Annualized average 28.5 % -40.6 % -28.3 % -19.9 % -16.5 %
Annualized median 8.1 % -31.4 % -16.2 % -12.1 % -7.7 %
CAR(-250,-1) AR(0) CAR(1,125) CAR(1,250) CAR(1,500) CAR(1,750)
Number of observations 42                   42             38                   30                   24                   23                   
Average 44.5 % -2.2 % 10.3 % 22.3 % 50.8 % 52.0 %
Median 38.3 % -1.0 % -1.3 % 8.1 % 49.7 % 42.4 %
% Positive observations 76% 43% 50% 57% 63% 61%
P-value 0.00000 0.01528 0.25300 0.12795 0.07045 0.07898
t-value 5.08                -2.43         1.14                1.52                1.81                1.76                
Annualized average 44.5 % 20.6 % 22.3 % 25.4 % 17.3 %
Annualized median 38.3 % -2.6 % 8.1 % 24.8 % 14.1 %
CAR(-250,-1) AR(0) CAR(1,125) CAR(1,250) CAR(1,500) CAR(1,750)
Number of observations 44                   44             43                   41                   32                   22                   
Average 9.5 % -0.9 % -14.8 % -25.6 % -36.2 % -54.0 %
Median 13.5 % -0.3 % -16.0 % -34.7 % -30.3 % -34.3 %
% Positive observations 70% 43% 35% 37% 28% 27%
P-value 0.11887 0.06081 0.00125 0.00163 0.00022 0.00337
t-value 1.56                -1.87         -3.23              -3.15              -3.69              -2.93              
Annualized average 9.5 % -29.6 % -25.6 % -18.1 % -18.0 %
Annualized median 13.5 % -31.9 % -34.7 % -15.2 % -11.4 %
CAR(-250,-1) AR(0) CAR(1,125) CAR(1,250) CAR(1,500) CAR(1,750)
Number of observations 43                   43             40                   34                   21                   15                   
Average 26.6 % -2.0 % -7.9 % -10.0 % -38.7 % -25.0 %
Median 19.7 % -1.7 % -5.3 % 1.1 % -17.4 % -17.1 %
% Positive observations 67% 33% 38% 53% 43% 47%
P-value 0.00275 0.00081 0.01263 0.14803 0.06252 0.29941
t-value 2.99                -3.35         -2.49              -1.45              -1.86              -1.04              
Annualized average 26.6 % -15.8 % -10.0 % -19.3 % -8.3 %
Annualized median 19.7 % -10.5 % 1.1 % -8.7 % -5.7 %
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6. Analysis 
6.1 Agency-costs effects 
Monitoring hypothesis 
According to Wruck’s (1989) monitoring hypothesis, the share price reaction to a private 
placement should be positive, since the number of active investors and the ownership 
concentration both increase. However, the results between 2004 and 2010 from private 
placements on the OSE show a significant -1.5% abnormal return on the announcement day. 
Overall, only 37% of the observed abnormal share price returns on the announcement day 
were positive. There are numerous possible explanations for this discrepancy.  
Wruck’s findings of a positive share price reaction are notably higher for firms with a low 
ownership concentration, namely in firms where the largest owner owns less than 5% of the 
outstanding shares. Less than 1% of the listed firms on the OSE between 2004 and 2010 
match this criterion. In nearly 50 percent of the firms on the OSE, the largest shareholder 
holds between 5% and 25% of the outstanding shares, according to Døskeland and Mjøs 
(2007). Within this group, Wruck observes a negative share price reaction, similar to the 
findings of this thesis.  
Schleifer and Vishny (1988) add that if a purchaser in the private placement has a substantial 
stake in the firm prior to the private placement, the share price reaction should reflect the 
increased probability of a takeover bid. It would be advantageous to investigate how the 
sample private placements affect ownership structure, though this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, the observed negative abnormal market reaction does not indicate an 
increased probability of a takeover bid.  
Furthermore, Wruck suggests that the purchasers in a private placement are active investors, 
and thus, there should be an increase in the monitoring of management following a private 
placement. The increased monitoring should induce a positive share price reaction. Jensen 
and Meckling support this view, as they find a positive share price reaction to private 
placements directed towards outside investors. However, based on the description in the 
associated press releases, most of the private placements on the OSE between 2004 and 2010 
are directed towards an extended group of investors – most often towards private, 
professional and institutional investors, both Norwegian and international. Hence, it is 
difficult to claim that private placements on the OSE are especially targeted towards active 
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investors. In addition, Døskeland and Mjøs find a decreasing share of active investors on the 
OSE over a period leading up to 2007. The extensive use of private placement within the 
period has probably contributed to this development. 
Managerial-entrenchment hypothesis 
Both Dann and DeAngelo (1988) and Wruck (1989) report some evidence of managerial 
entrenchment. While Dann and DeAngelo find a negative share price reaction when the 
private placements are used to reduce the potential threat of a takeover, Wruck finds a 
negative share price reaction to private placements in which a large owner come into a 
position of control.  
Barclay et al. (2007) argue that private placements are used to place shares in the hands of 
friendly investors to dissuade bidders of the firm. They suggest this is done to solidify the 
managers’ control of the firm. Their findings are supported by results from a large sample 
size. The long-run event study results of this thesis offer strong support to the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis, albeit with a smaller sample size.  
The announcement press releases indicate that most private placements on the OSE are used 
to obtain cash quickly, while the targeted investors seem to resemble those of a public issue. 
Many of the firms on the OSE are relatively small and highly capital intensive, so private 
placements could be a way for managers to increase firm size in a matter that increase the 
share held by passive investors and consequently solidifies their own position. If this is the 
case, it would be in line with the findings of Barclay et al. Out of the 222 private placements 
in the sample, the great majority resemble passive placements, as Barclay et al. called the 
private placements with “no evidence of interactions between the purchasers and the issuing 
firms either before or after the placements”. To determine what type of investors actually 
bought stock in the private placements, however, one would need to obtain additional data 
from the Norwegian Central Securities Depository (The VPS). This is beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  
The observed cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on the OSE prior to the announcement is 
comparable to Barclay et al.. They observe an abnormal positive share price development in 
the ten days leading up to the announcement for passive private placements, similar to the 
2.87% CAR(-5,-1) observed in this thesis. After the private placement announcement the 
data from the OSE shows a -5.4% CAR[1,125], while Barclay et al. reports a -9.9% 
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CAR[1,130]. The difference between the datasets is only distinctive in the short-run. On the 
announcement day, Barclay et al. find a 1.4% abnormal return for passive placements, while 
the OSE shows a -1.5% abnormal return. Over the first 20 days subsequent to the private 
placement, Barclay et al. find no distinctive trend in the cumulative abnormal returns for 
passive placements. However, from that point forward these placements show a similar 
negative trend to the one found in the private placements on the OSE.  
The results from the OSE are in line with what the managerial entrenchment hypothesis 
predicts. On the announcement day, the stock market should react negatively, as the 
discounted shares provided in the private placement are compensation for more 
entrenchment. This contributes to a lower valuation of the firm. The drop in share value on 
the announcement day supports this view, although the drop is only significant before 
adjusting for the private placement discount. In the long-run event window, the data 
continues to support the managerial-entrenchment hypothesis. By extending the event 
window, the likelihood of capturing the value effects of the private placement decision will 
be vastly improved. The long-run event study shows highly significant negative cumulative 
abnormal returns subsequent to the announcement, with the annualized drop in share price 
being the largest in the first six months subsequent to the private placement. These results 
suggest that the managerial-entrenchment hypothesis – more than the monitoring hypothesis 
– capture the observed share price reactions on the OSE.  
Comparable studies from other countries find positive cumulative abnormal returns for a 
period subsequent to the private placement. However, after this period the abnormal returns 
turn negative, as observed on the OSE. Participants in other markets might be more 
optimistic on private placements than their Norwegian counterparts, or investment banks 
might take on more underwriting in the private placements, thus giving incentives to 
continue to feed the market with positive information in the period subsequent to the private 
placement. This will provide time to sell off the investment bank’s stake with a profit. 
Convergence of interest 
The convergence-of-interest hypothesis presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is focused 
on the alignment of interests between shareholders and management. It predicts a positive 
share price reaction to the announcement of a private placement if the management or other 
insiders increase their ownership share in the firm.  
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The evidence from the OSE can give some support to this hypothesis. Based on the 
announcement press releases, a large majority of the private placements on the OSE are 
targeted towards a wide range of investors. These issues should lead to less alignment 
between shareholders and management, as the large shareholders should be worse off when 
the range of investors that participate increases. However, the OSE has many family-owned 
firms, and firms with high ownership concentrations, each with groups of investors that 
would be favored in a private placement. Thus, it is impossible to say anything significant 
about the share owned by insiders without ownership data.   
Redistribution of wealth 
Galai and Masulis (1976) look at private placements as a redistribution of wealth. The issue 
of additional equity reduces the risk; hence, the debt is more likely to be paid off and will 
increase in value. The shareholders will obtain the rest of the added value in the private 
placement. However, the increased value of the debt will, in effect, decrease the share price. 
This is consistent with the results from the OSE, as firms that mention financial restructuring 
in their press releases show a larger negative announcement effect than the rest of the private 
placements. These firms should be the most distressed firms in the sample, and as a result 
one would expect a larger wealth transfer between debt holders and shareholders in these 
firms.  
6.2 Price-pressure effects 
Scholes (1972) stated that since each share is unique, the lack of perfect substitutes in the 
market causes the demand curve for each share to be a downward sloping curve. Different 
papers have found inconsistent support of this hypothesis. Both analyzing the relative size of 
the equity issue to the firm size as well as the size relative to other equity issues in the 
sample has given mixed results. The data on the OSE offers some support to the price-
pressure hypothesis, with 62 percent of the shares showing a negative abnormal return on the 
announcement date. However, the change in the stock market from when the hypothesis was 
stated in 1972 until today has been significant. The stock markets have become more easily 
accessible, and the market place has become a global arena. The transaction costs have been 
greatly reduced, and more data is spread between market participants. The development of 
the markets should have dramatically decreased the relevance of the price pressure 
hypothesis, as each share has become less unique. Most likely, the observed abnormal 
returns observed on the announcement day are due to other effects than price-pressure. 
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6.3 Information effects 
Numerous hypotheses based on information effects try to explain the observed abnormal 
share price movements in the short-run period around private placements. However, in 
assessing the consistency of information effects, it is essential to note that issuing firms can 
be in very different situations. Healthy firms can use private placements as a sophisticated 
way of providing information to the market, while the information effects from private 
placements by distressed firms are more primitive. The information effects come in different 
forms; changes in ownership structure, changes in capital structure, and changes in capital 
expenditure. The significant negative announcement effect on the OSE is supported by some 
information effects, while the results are inconsistent with others. 
Information effects from changes in ownership structure 
Leland and Pyle (1977) predict an abnormal positive share price reaction if insiders increase 
their ownership share through a private placement. They argue that insiders have better 
information regarding future cash flow, and the market should perceive it as positive 
information if they increase their ownership share. Based on the press releases collected 
from Newsweb and talks with market participants, most private placements on the OSE are 
targeted towards the most important shareholders. Thus, the negative market reaction to 
private placements observed in this thesis, albeit insignificant when adjusting for discounts, 
does not support Leland and Pyle`s theories.  
Classic financial theory says that raising capital is costless, as you get a fair price in an 
efficient capital market. Hence, every project with a positive net present value should be 
undertaken regardless of how you raise the money for the initial investment. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) created a model that tries to capture the effects of information asymmetry 
between managers of the firm and investors. With information asymmetry, investors expect 
that the announcement of an equity issue conceals negative information. This causes the 
market to revise the share price, since the management of the firm would only issue equity if 
the share price is higher than the intrinsic value of the shares.  
The results from the OSE offer some support to this pecking order theory. The private 
placements on the OSE undertaken between 2004 and 2010 have an announcement effect of 
-0.95% (-0.75% median) after adjusting for the private placement discount. This is consistent 
with the downward revision predicted by the adverse-selection hypothesis, but it is only 
significant at the 10% level. About two-thirds of the private placements led to a negative 
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abnormal return on the announcement day, indicating that a larger sample size might lead to 
a more significant adjusted announcement effect.  
Another effect that a change in ownership may imply was put forward by Hertzel and Smith 
(1993). They found a positive abnormal return on the announcement of a private placement 
on the NASDAQ and argued that the value certification by informed led to the positive 
effect. The results of this thesis are not consistent with the positive market reaction predicted 
by the certification hypothesis. However, certification is expected to be more needed in 
growth firms with low book values. This type of firm is nearly non-existent on the OSE. 
Thus, one cannot reject this information effect based on the inconsistent results from the 
OSE, even though the market reaction to private placements in the subsample consisting of 
the firms with the largest price-to-book ratios was very similar to the rest of the sample.  
Information effects from changes in capital structure  
Ross (1977) argues that given value maximization by managers, private placements convey 
information about lower future cash flows. He argues that the managers will decrease 
leverage and provide more flexibility on the asset side in order to face more demanding 
times. This is highly consistent with the long-run returns following the average private 
placement in the OSE sample. The results indicate that earnings expectations are 
exaggerated in the months leading up to the private placement. This leads to favorable 
conditions for existing shareholders, as it costs less to obtain the necessary cash. 
Nevertheless, it signals to the market that the share could face a downward trend subsequent 
to the private placement, as observed on the OSE in the sample period. Earnings estimates 
from management and investment banks should be researched further to determine whether 
or not they explain the results of this thesis. 
Information effects from changes in capital expenditure 
Miller and Rock (1985) view a private placement as a signal of lack of internal funding for 
upcoming investments, leading to a downward revision of the value of current earnings. The 
negative discount-adjusted market reaction to the private placement announcement, 
significant on the 10% level, is in line with Miller and Rock`s view – although the 
breakdown of the sample into categories dependent on the intended use of the proceeds from 
the private placements did not provide any clear support for the existence of information 
asymmetries.  
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Overall, the results suggest that the market finds the intended use of the proceeds in the 
private placement inferior to the firms existing business, or that the proceeds are needed 
because the ongoing projects expected cash flow generation is overstated. This results in a 
downward revision of the value of the firm. However, one should not draw too many 
conclusions based on these results, due to the limited sample size for each category. 
6.4 Timing and value destruction 
Timing by managers seems to be the most likely explanation for the apparent peak in share 
prices observed around the announcement day. As previously noted, this peak is particularly 
pronounced in the half year before and after the private placement. Managers should have 
better information than the market, making them able to issue equity when they see the 
company as overvalued. Managers have a responsibility both towards existing and new 
investors, however, and if this is the current practice, it favors the former group.  
The year before the private placement announcement the average sample firm has a 28.6% 
(18.8% median) positive cumulative abnormal return. This is significant at conventional 
levels. The results are consistent with the predicted overvaluation of firms conducting an 
equity issue. Although an overvaluation of the firm’s assets will cause both the equity and 
the risky debt to be overvalued, the relative overvaluation of the debt is less than that of the 
equity. Thus, the firm avoids a wealth transfer to new shareholders. On average, there is a 
significant run-up in the year before the private placement, with an accelerated pace the last 
50 trading days. A possible key factor to this could be investment banks and managers 
deliberately feeding the market with positive information to increase the issue price, though 
further analyses must be undertaken to confirm or reject this hypothesis. 
The long-run effects subsequent to the private placement further build to approve the 
hypothesis that firms issuing equity are overvalued. In the following six months CAR[1,125] 
the shares fell by an average of -5.4% (-7.1%). The negative trend continues over three 
years, as CAR[1,750] shows a fall of -18.0% (19.7%). One cannot read too much into the 
magnitude of the drop in the share price over such a long period, due to the difficulties in 
conducting a long-run event study and the decreasing number of firms in the sample. In 
addition, the sample period was a very unique period because of the financial crisis. The 
market model is unlikely to fully capture these properties. 
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The trend in the dataset is still clear; the average firm issuing equity through a private 
placement on the OSE during 2004-2010 was overvalued on the announcement day. 
However, from one year prior to the private placement to three years after, the average firm 
has a positive cumulative abnormal return. However, since the observed cumulative 
abnormal returns over the four-year period peak exactly on the announcement date, one 
could argue that the average private placement investor invested in the firm at the worst 
possible time. Then again, this could be specific for the sample period. 
It is unlikely that timing is the only explanation for the underperformance of sample firms in 
the years after the private placement. As mentioned earlier, part of the explanation probably 
has to do with the period itself. Energy firms dominate the sample, a group that was hit hard 
by the fall of oil prices in 2008. This surely impacts the sample results, although using sector 
indices as benchmarks leads to the same conclusions. 
Nonetheless, the long-run results indicate that the money invested in private placements was 
not put to good use. Subsample analysis suggests that this is mainly driven by the largest half 
of the sample, measured by market capitalization. Although it is difficult to interpret these 
findings without further research, one possible explanation could be that advisory firms and 
investment banks target larger firms, since they are more valuable customers. Managers 
could thus be encouraged to issue equity, even though this might not be in the best interest of 
the shareholders.  
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7. Conclusion 
The results in this thesis support the managerial-entrenchment hypothesis presented by 
Barclay et al. (2007). The announcement of a private placement with cash settlements on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange between 1.1.2004 and 12.31.2010 was on average followed by a 
significant -1.5% abnormal return on the announcement day, while the two years subsequent 
to the announcement show an average cumulative abnormal return of -16.1%. However, the 
market reaction on the announcement day after adjusting for private placement discounts 
was only significant at the 10% level. The results also support management timing, as the 
cumulative abnormal return in the year prior to the private placement announcement was 
28.6%, indicating that management raises new capital when they view the firm as 
overvalued. 
Both the significant long-run positive abnormal return prior to, and the long-run negative 
abnormal return subsequent to the private placement is highly indicative of a share valuation 
above the intrinsic value on the announcement day. Over a four-year period, the average 
private placement is carried out when the cumulative abnormal return is at its highest. This 
indicates that managers hold better information of the true valuation of the firm and use it to 
issue equity when they know that the firm is overvalued. As the sample was further 
analyzed, the largest 50 percent of firms accounted for most of the timing effect. It appears 
that the necessity for the private placement was greater for the smaller firms, as the returns 
for larger firms seem to indicate inferior investment opportunities.  
In addition, although there are many underlying factors, increased attention from investment 
banks could help explain the unambiguous run-up observed both for small and large firms in 
the months leading up to the private placement, though further analysis is needed to 
determine this.  
The results are very similar to those observed for passive private placements by Barclay et 
al. (2007). They categorized a large sample of private placements into passive, active and 
managerial, depending on how the investor interacted with the issuing firm post-placement, 
and if the investor was part of the existing top management. They found significant negative 
post-placement abnormal returns for passive placements. Very few private placements on the 
OSE seem to be targeted towards active investors, supporting the managerial-entrenchment 
hypothesis that managers use private placements to solidify their control of the company by 
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placing shares in the hands of friendly investors. The significant negative long-run abnormal 
returns observed in this thesis support the view that passive private placements are the 
representative private placements on the OSE. Even though there are various other factors at 
work, the findings in this thesis strengthen the argument that managerial entrenchment 
explains many private placements conducted in the sample period. 
The observed negative abnormal share price reaction on the announcement day contradicts 
both Wruck`s monitoring hypothesis (1989) and Hertzel and Smith`s (1993) certification 
hypothesis. Because of the high ownership concentration of the OSE and the focus towards 
capital-intensive sectors, these results are not surprising. In such an environment there will 
be a smaller need for certification, and most private placements will lead to lower 
monitoring. Hence, these popular hypotheses do not seem to be very relevant for the OSE. 
Based on this thesis, private placements on the OSE do not seem to be targeted towards 
valuable investors aside from the firm’s current main shareholders. Instead, it appears to be 
customary on the OSE to use private placements as a substitute for rights issues. There could 
be many reasons for this. Firstly, private placements provide management with the flexibility 
to act quickly with regards to investments and acquisitions, while also reducing the chance 
of information leakages. The benefits seems suited to the OSE which has a capital-intensive 
energy sector driven by contracts. Nonetheless, private placements dilute the shares of non-
invited shareholders.  
Secondly, as the private placements are carried out in just one trading day it is easier to take 
advantage of an overvaluation. In a rights issue, the share price can more easily adapt to the 
information from the announcement and move closer to the intrinsic value during the 
subscription period.  
Lastly, the increased popularity of board authorizations has made it easier to conduct a 
private placement. This enhanced flexibility increases the managers’ chances to solidify their 
position in the firm by allocating more shares to passive and friendly investors.  
With more time and resources available, it would be interesting to look at ownership data 
and volume data to try to get a clearer explanation for the observed share price developments 
in this thesis. An alternative angle for further studies would be to research the earnings 
estimates of equity analysts connected to the investment bank carrying out the private 
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placement to see how they can be connected to the positive abnormal share price movement 
prior to private placements.  
Criticism 
The small sample size limits the possible inferences drawn from the data. The sample period 
could have been expanded, although the use of private placements was limited before 2004. 
The large variances in both daily and monthly stock returns made it difficult to analyze the 
results of the event studies.  
At the time of this thesis, the event- and dividend-adjusted stock returns for 2011 were not 
yet available from Amadeus. As a result of this, the long term event study was limited to 
only include CAR(1,250) for 2004-2009, CAR(1,500) for 2004-2008 and CAR(1,750) for 
2004-2007. The 2004-2008 stock market boom was a unique period for the Norwegian stock 
market, characterized by overoptimistic investors. The results of the long-run event study in 
this thesis must be viewed with this in mind.  
While the methods used in the short-run event study are widely accepted throughout 
academia, the long-run event study was more challenging to conduct, as the longer time 
horizon makes the results more sensitive to the choice of normal returns model. Any test of 
market efficiency is a simultaneous test of the asset pricing model used (Fama 1977), but 
Fama (1998) argues that the joint hypothesis problem is smaller for short-run event studies, 
since daily returns are close to zero. Thus, the observed share price developments in the days 
around the private placements should be viewed with more validity than the positive drift in 
the year before and the negative drift in the years after.  
The beta estimates used throughout this thesis are subject to discussion. Since the actual 
values are unobservable, the estimated beta values for some firms might be far from the 
actual relative correlation with the stock market.  
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Appendix 
Sample private placements 
 
Company Date Size (NOK)
Norse Energy Corp. 13.01.2004 36 000 000
IGNIS 21.01.2004 21 888 090
Solstad Offshore 29.01.2004 107 000 000
Tandberg Storage 02.02.2004 11 045 000
Star Reefers Inc. 11.02.2004 63 463 377
Data Respons 17.02.2004 26 500 000
Birdstep Technology 20.02.2004 75 525 000
Eitzen Maritime Services 10.03.2004 7 800 000
Q-Free 20.04.2004 27 300 000
Technor 09.06.2004 100 008 000
Eltek 26.08.2004 166 380 000
PA Resources 09.09.2004 17 677 854
TTS Group 06.10.2004 22 778 800
Tandberg Storage 03.11.2004 12 335 864
Altinex 01.12.2004 44 000 000
Tandberg Television 02.12.2004 256 300 000
Hexagon Composites 10.12.2004 35 340 000
NextGen Tel Holding ASA 10.12.2004 98 182 500
Global Geo Services 20.12.2004 26 426 000
PA Resources 22.12.2004 18 750 000
Green Reefers 18.01.2005 58 420 000
TTS Group 31.01.2005 30 660 000
Lerøy Seafood Group 01.02.2005 130 872 000
Sevan Marine 09.02.2005 111 709 000
Hands ASA 10.02.2005 9 450 000
Blom 18.02.2005 35 112 500
PA Resources 04.03.2005 33 250 000
Stepstone 16.03.2005 51 800 000
Tandberg Data 16.03.2005 41 850 000
DiaGenic 08.04.2005 20 340 996
Opticom ASA 04.05.2005 58 197 330
Altinex 20.05.2005 105 710 000
Petrojack 26.05.2005 34 169 850
Tandberg Storage 01.06.2005 13 418 500
PA Resources 03.06.2005 153 000 000
Norse Energy Corp. 06.06.2005 63 500 000
Global Geo Services 08.06.2005 35 096 000
Crew Gold Corporation 09.06.2005 144 320 000
Domstein 10.06.2005 40 972 500
Rocksource 15.06.2005 43 547 280
Sevan Marine 24.06.2005 130 860 000
Norse Energy Corp. 30.06.2005 97 650 000
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Company Date Size (NOK)
Nio Security 08.08.2005 11 475 000
Crew Gold Corporation 16.08.2005 204 225 000
TTS Group 26.08.2005 57 150 000
Tandberg Television 31.08.2005 591 500 000
Questerre Energy Corporation 02.09.2005 43 446 452
Rocksource 07.09.2005 260 000 000
Data Respons 08.09.2005 35 720 000
Mamut 23.09.2005 58 400 000
Sevan Marine 27.09.2005 257 685 000
IGE Resources 30.09.2005 31 500 000
Tandberg Data 30.09.2005 53 250 000
Global Geo Services 05.10.2005 49 549 500
Petrojack 25.10.2005 45 600 000
Opticom ASA 09.11.2005 90 302 980
Stepstone 17.11.2005 72 980 000
Fast Search & Transfer 22.11.2005 610 082 000
Kitron 22.11.2005 45 240 000
Petrolia 20.12.2005 119 768 190
Synnøve Finden 23.12.2005 25 150 900
Scorpion Offshore 06.01.2006 166 500 000
Altinex 11.01.2006 60 320 000
Nio Security 11.01.2006 14 025 000
PA Resources 13.01.2006 248 500 000
Sinvest 24.01.2006 280 500 000
Norse Energy Corp. 26.01.2006 124 800 000
Future Information Research Management 01.02.2006 30 090 000
Tandberg Television 10.02.2006 542 500 000
Questerre Energy Corporation 17.02.2006 42 350 000
SeaDril l 22.02.2006 1 415 000 000
Sevan Marine 22.02.2006 1 549 998 000
Petrolia 24.02.2006 196 100 000
Funcom 01.03.2006 131 150 000
Songa Offshore 07.03.2006 365 400 000
Global Geo Services 15.03.2006 36 708 000
Marine Harvest 16.03.2006 694 800 000
Fara 16.03.2006 14 315 543
DiaGenic 17.03.2006 33 250 000
Crew Gold Corporation 28.03.2006 419 900 000
Petrojack 30.03.2006 105 350 000
Opera Software 30.03.2006 211 250 000
Norwegian Air Shuttle 31.03.2006 119 600 000
SeaDril l 03.04.2006 3 510 000 000
Petrolia 21.04.2006 602 250 000
Lerøy Seafood Group 25.04.2006 440 300 000
Havila Shipping 26.04.2006 82 650 000
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Company Date Size (NOK)
Data Respons 05.05.2006 37 675 000
SeaBird Exploration 08.05.2006 102 400 000
APL 10.05.2006 216 910 000
Norstat 11.05.2006 18 060 000
Simrad Optronics 31.05.2006 16 005 675
Eastern Dril l ing 01.06.2006 1 199 999 970
Altinex 02.06.2006 499 999 000
Questerre Energy Corporation 09.06.2006 56 118 020
Captura 23.06.2006 12 103 000
Atea 05.07.2006 420 000 010
PA Resources 27.07.2006 175 420 000
Golden Ocean Group 09.08.2006 128 625 000
Camillo Eitzen & Co 23.08.2006 229 250 000
Fara 01.09.2006 15 000 000
Global Geo Services 01.09.2006 80 024 970
Synnøve Finden 01.09.2006 40 250 000
SeaBird Exploration 08.09.2006 199 990 000
CanArgo Energy Corporation 20.09.2006 111 596 649
Navamedic 13.10.2006 9 884 160
Scorpion Offshore 18.10.2006 238 000 000
IGNIS 17.11.2006 37 920 000
Stepstone 17.11.2006 184 500 000
Mamut 22.11.2006 63 865 000
TTS Group 08.12.2006 131 534 850
IGE Resources 08.12.2006 126 000 000
DOF 12.12.2006 402 000 000
PA Resources 13.12.2006 270 000 000
AGR Group 15.12.2006 171 059 850
Petrolia 15.12.2006 264 880 000
Questerre Energy Corporation 19.12.2006 100 800 000
Songa Offshore 20.12.2006 218 750 000
Fairstar Heavy Transport 22.12.2006 85 215 000
Geo ASA 18.01.2007 276 500 000
Blom 18.01.2007 129 600 000
Marine Farms 02.02.2007 60 060 000
Revus Energy ASA 06.02.2007 217 793 400
Hexagon Composites 07.02.2007 50 500 000
Tandberg Storage 13.02.2007 44 999 000
Odfjell  Invest 27.02.2007 510 365 850
IMAREX 08.03.2007 88 253 100
Sevan Marine 21.03.2007 743 487 500
Rocksource 22.03.2007 77 777 700
Norwegian Property 29.03.2007 499 999 992
Wentworth Resources 30.03.2007 215 020 000
Bionor Pharma 19.04.2007 24 381 500
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Company Date Size (NOK)
BWG Homes 19.04.2007 652 399 110
Camillo Eitzen & Co 03.05.2007 228 203 438
DiaGenic 03.05.2007 25 805 000
Simrad Optronics 07.05.2007 55 838 010
Komplett 10.05.2007 129 000 000
Codfarmers 22.05.2007 49 244 800
Global Geo Services 01.06.2007 200 000 000
Copeinca 18.06.2007 780 000 000
Birdstep Technology 19.06.2007 117 000 000
Northland Resources 19.06.2007 604 001 250
Biotec Pharmacon 21.06.2007 92 402 700
Funcom 27.06.2007 180 950 000
Seadril l 11.07.2007 889 000 000
Scorpion Offshore 25.07.2007 279 300 000
Nio Security 01.08.2007 8 890 000
Simtronics 16.08.2007 32 016 000
Global Geo Services 22.08.2007 425 000 000
Goodtech 12.09.2007 80 000 000
Norstat 21.09.2007 14 418 819
Dolphin Group 16.10.2007 8 145 000
Sevan Marine 16.10.2007 1 064 630 000
TTS Group 07.11.2007 242 000 000
Wentworth Resources 08.11.2007 528 000 000
Apptix 19.11.2007 28 000 000
Golar LNG 19.11.2007 425 600 000
Revus Energy ASA 14.12.2007 437 470 000
Mamut 19.12.2007 52 390 000
Nio Security 15.02.2008 11 000 000
IMAREX 18.02.2008 149 994 400
Tandberg Storage 27.02.2008 11 100 000
SeaBird Exploration 28.02.2008 121 500 000
Seadril l 11.04.2008 195 000 000
Kongsberg Automotive Holding 16.04.2008 549 990 000
IGE Resources 17.04.2008 50 320 000
DiaGenic 08.05.2008 44 800 000
Revus Energy ASA 21.05.2008 366 383 776
Oceanteam ASA 21.05.2008 103 826 475
Questerre Energy Corporation 22.05.2008 178 500 000
Dolphin Group 06.06.2008 13 340 000
Sevan Marine 11.06.2008 1 210 672 000
Crew Gold Corporation 13.06.2008 324 563 850
Frontline 26.06.2008 1 071 000 000
AGR Group 27.06.2008 34 200 000
Scorpion Offshore 27.06.2008 434 700 000
Songa Offshore 16.10.2008 265 000 000
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Company Date Size (NOK)
Algeta 18.02.2009 245 300 000
Scorpion Offshore 04.03.2009 432 432 432
Fara 27.04.2009 46 635 000
Norwegian Energy Company 05.05.2009 214 400 000
Marine Harvest 08.05.2009 302 400 000
Mamut 15.05.2009 34 425 000
DOF 20.05.2009 243 965 000
Petroleum Geo-Services 28.05.2009 656 999 964
Sevan Marine 03.06.2009 1 100 000 000
Grieg Seafood 10.06.2009 139 055 000
Rocksource 10.06.2009 126 225 000
PA Resources 16.06.2009 239 580 000
Scandinavian Property Development 26.06.2009 700 000 000
Norse Energy Corp. 16.09.2009 135 968 336
Austevoll  Seafood 17.09.2009 653 200 000
Norwegian Energy Company 23.09.2009 1 200 000 000
Q-Free 23.10.2009 109 650 000
Norwegian Air Shuttle 06.11.2009 251 100 000
SeaBird Exploration 11.11.2009 189 000 000
Green Reefers 25.11.2009 60 000 000
Electromagnetic Geoservices 02.12.2009 135 000 000
IGNIS 02.12.2009 13 500 000
Star Reefers Inc. 15.12.2009 105 000 000
Norse Energy Corp. 12.01.2010 299 999 999
Songa Offshore 17.02.2010 594 500 000
IGNIS 22.02.2010 30 000 000
Fairstar Heavy Transport 23.02.2010 53 968 750
Norwegian Property 11.03.2010 543 912 000
Songa Offshore 25.03.2010 300 585 000
Seadril l 13.04.2010 1 893 750 000
Dolphin Group 16.04.2010 11 658 000
Rocksource 30.04.2010 249 093 300
IGE Resources 04.05.2010 31 023 679
Nio Security 16.06.2010 4 900 000
Fairstar Heavy Transport 25.06.2010 212 500 000
TTS Group 06.07.2010 42 354 396
Siem Offshore 07.07.2010 348 980 984
IGNIS 21.09.2010 27 798 400
IGE Resources 22.09.2010 88 641 747
Petroleum Geo-Services 16.11.2010 1 643 399 834
Clavis Pharma 18.11.2010 154 000 000
DNO International 18.11.2010 360 000 000
Morpol 08.12.2010 311 600 000
NorDiag 17.12.2010 11 171 750
Biotec Pharmacon 23.12.2010 22 050 000
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CASE: Petrolia Drilling 
To illustrate the use of private placements at the OSE during the 2004-2010 it can be 
worthwhile to take a closer look at a firm that conducted several private placements during a 
short amount of time within the sample period.  
At the 2005 annual general meeting the board of Petrolia Drilling (now Petrolia) was given a 
mandate to issue new equity up to 50 percent of the existing share capital, the maximum 
allowed by law. They have since been given the same mandate every year.  
In just over a year from late 2005 to late 2006, Petrolia Drilling issued equity in five separate 
private placements. After a turbulent couple of years for the firm without any significant 
revenue, they entered an expansion phase. The management expressed a positive view on the 
future, and talked about the opportunity to take part in what looked like the best rig market in 
years.  
Petrolia Drilling share price development 
 
Figure 9 
On November 29th 2005, after a recent surge in the share price, Petrolia Drilling issued 
NOK 52 million (25% of existing share capital) in a private placement that increased the 
ownership share of the biggest owner to over 35%. A month later, the firm conducted 
another private placement, this time bringing in NOK 120 million. During the course of 
2006, the firm carried out three additional private placements for total proceeds of over NOK 
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1 billion. The stated reasons for these private placements were a combination of rig 
investments and for general corporate purposes. They were all done within the limits of the 
2005 and 2006 board authorizations given at the annual general meetings. 
Plotting these five private placements together with the firm’s share price development 
through the 2004-2010 period, as shown by figure X, Petrolia Drilling seems to be an 
example of a firm issuing equity at a time where the stock is overvalued. However, deeper 
analysis is needed to determine if dilution and value destruction as a result of extensive use 
of private placements are part of the reason for the share price plunge in the subsequent 
years. Rig companies are extremely influenced by the current market conditions, so it is to 
be expected that the fall of 2007-2008 was mainly due to a deterioration of the rates in the 
rig market. 
